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Abstract
This dissertation uses experimental and quasi-experimental methods to evaluate policy
instruments available to state and local officials administering food assistance programs for
improving children’s utilization of services, nutritional intake, and food security. More
specifically, this dissertation consists of three chapters pertaining to the National School Lunch
Program (NSLP) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).
In the first chapter, co-authored with Amy Ellen Schwartz, I use large, uniquely detailed
longitudinal administrative data on New York City students and schools, including the different
lunch menus they offer over time, to present the first plausibly causal evidence on the link
between school menus and participation in the NSLP, and their implications for disparities in
program utilization across students from diverse backgrounds. Using student and school fixedeffects models, I find that the introduction of new menus increases the share of students
participating on both the extensive and intensive margins, and can help to close racial, gender,
and socioeconomic gaps in the utilization of school lunch. In one extension, I find evidence that
increases in participation are driven by the adoption of newer, more innovative menus. I find no
evidence of changes in attendance or adverse weight outcomes. These findings provide evidence
in support of the efforts that many school districts are taking to boost lunch participation by
reformulating their menus and help to inform the decisions of those considering similar changes.
While students stand to gain from participating in school lunch, it is also important that
they make the right dietary choices as they make their way through the lunch line. In the second
chapter, I use primary data collected through a month-long field and survey experiment I
designed and conducted to investigate the efficacy of using cheap material rewards to induce
better dietary choices among low-income Black and Hispanic children—who are more likely to

be obese than their high-income or white peers—in a school lunch setting. While existing studies
have shown material rewards to be effective in the short term and when introduced
intermittently, this study shows that their effect can dissipate quickly over time when offered
daily. I find no evidence that the introduction of extrinsic incentives crowded out intrinsic dietary
behaviors. These findings have implications for the design and implementation interventions
using material rewards for improving dietary habits among school-aged children.
In the third chapter, I broaden the scope of my research to include SNAP, which helps to
safeguard the food security of millions of children. The politicization and racialization of the
program have made it a target of reforms that effectively limit its coverage and efficacy, and
contribute to its disparate implementation across states and counties in ways that exacerbate
social inequity. I designed a large survey experiment evaluating the efficacy of highlighting the
child beneficiaries of SNAP for inducing greater public support for the program. I find that
emphasizing its child beneficiaries can increase support overall and across key political
constituencies, though more so when those children are characterized as White than Black. As an
extension, I also examine the generalizability of these findings to the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families program, and again find that highlighting child beneficiaries leads to increases in
support, though the estimated effects are less pronounced and even more so dependent on the
children’s race. These findings can help to inform the outreach efforts of program administrators.
This dissertation adds to the existing literature by providing new insights and expanding
on previous work. The results of the first chapter corroborate the many anecdotal accounts
suggesting that school menus influence student lunch participation, but also show that other
barriers, such as the price of meals or stigma, may be more important. The second chapter
extends previous work on using material rewards to induce better dietary behaviors by presenting

evidence that they may not be as cost-effective or easy to implement as previously thought. The
findings of the third chapter show that providing information on the child beneficiaries of
welfare programs can change public attitudes towards them and offer fresh evidence that public
opinion of government policy is often based on the demographic groups perceived to benefit
from them. This dissertation also highlights the implications that policy instruments can have for
social equity and economic equality by focusing on disparities in program utilization, access, and
outcomes across race, gender, age, and socioeconomic status. Lastly, it offers guidance for policy
makers and program administrators by providing new evidence about the efficacy of various
policy instruments available to them for administering food assistance programs.
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Chapter 1
What's for Lunch? The Relationship between School Menus and Student Lunch
Participation
Introduction
Students stand to gain a lot from eating school lunch, which has been linked to improved
nutritional intake, health outcomes, and academic performance (e.g., Gundersen et al., 2012;
Smith, 2017; Bartfeld, 2015; Hinrichs, 2010; Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019; Lin et al., 2019).
Schools also stand to benefit as higher student participation can boost test scores and help
schools avoid potential sanctions under accountability systems (Figlio & Winicki, 2005).
However, realizing these benefits requires that students participate, yet nearly half of them do not
(Hoynes & Schanzenbach, 2015). While the nutritional quality of school meals and their cost to
students has received much attention, little is known about how school menus—the set of meals
served throughout an academic year—influence participation in school lunch.
Although the federal government sets nutritional standards for meals served in schools
participating in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), school districts have considerable
discretion in setting school food policies, including what to serve their students. School menus
may therefore constitute an important policy instrument for increasing lunch participation at the
local level and districts nationwide have taken steps to reformulate their menus in an effort to
boost participation (Pew and RWJF, 2016; School Nutrition Association, 2017). In addition to
boosting participation overall, the choice of menus may also help close gaps in lunch
participation across students from different backgrounds, with potential implications for social
equity. Yet there is a dearth of rigorous research documenting and exploring student’s
responsiveness to new menus.

1

This study constitutes the first large-scale investigation of this relationship. Using unique,
detailed longitudinal student-level data and exploiting variation in the types of menus offered
across nearly 800 New York City (NYC) traditional public schools, we examine the relationship
between menus and the propensity for and intensity of lunch participation among middle and
high school students.1 Specifically, we use student fixed-effects models leveraging variation in
the types of menus students are exposed to over time while attending the same school together
with a range of control variables to estimate the impact of a new menu on lunch participation in
schools with Point of Service (POS) systems tracking lunch transactions. This study is the first to
make use of school menu data on this scale, and is among the first to make use of POS data—a
substantial improvement over the survey data on lunch participation used in previous work
(Moore, Hulsey, & Ponza, 2009). We also document difference in lunch participation across
students from diverse backgrounds and explore heterogeneous responsiveness to new menus by
student characteristics. In a series of extensions, we examine the interaction of new menus with
the introduction of free meals for all students and the relationships between different menu types
and lunch participation. Lastly, we assess potential linkages between menus and attendance and
weight outcomes. This paper focuses on middle and high school students as they are more likely
to make autonomous decisions about lunch than their elementary school counterparts (Gordon &
Fox, 2007; Fox & Condon, 2012).
New York City is an ideal setting for such a study, offering several advantages. First, the
NYC Department of Education (NYCDOE) is unique in that it offers over a dozen different
lunch menus that school principals can choose to serve their students, with many schools
adopting new menus over time, thereby providing the requisite variation for an analysis of menus

1

Propensity for lunch participation and lunch participation intensity can be understood as participation at the
extensive and intensive margins, respectively.

2

and participation. Second, while implementation of school lunch varies across schools in the
district, all are subject to uniform nutrition and competitive food policies. Third, the district’s
large and diverse student population facilitates the exploration of differential responsiveness to
school menus across students from diverse backgrounds. Fourth, the NYCDOE has diversified
and expanded its menus in ways similar to other school districts nationwide (e.g., Pew & RWJF,
2016; Student Nutrition Association, 2016, 2017). The results from this study may therefore help
to inform other school districts about the efficacy of their own initiatives.
To preview the results, we find that menus do matter for lunch participation. Overall,
adopting a new menu may increase the propensity and intensity of students participating by up to
four and three percentage points, respectively. Relative to baseline participation rates, these
constitute meaningfully large effects. Responsiveness to new menus also varies considerably by
student characteristics, suggesting that menus can help close demographic and socioeconomic
disparities in school lunch participation. The type of menus offered may also matter, as students
appear to respond more favorably to some than others. Lastly, we find no associations between
new menus and attendance, and no evidence of adverse effects on weight outcomes.
Background on the NSLP and Student Lunch Participation
The National School Lunch Act of 1946 established the NSLP to reduce child hunger,
improve children’s health, and promote the consumption of domestic agricultural commodities.
The program has since grown to become the second largest food assistance program in the
United States after the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and provides federally
subsidized free and low-cost meals to over 30 million children each school day in over 100,000
schools and childcare centers nationwide at a cost of $14 billion. While all students can
participate in the program, meals are typically provided using a three tiered system wherein
3

students from households with incomes below 130 percent of the federal poverty line are eligible
for free lunch, those between 130 and 185 percent eligible for reduced price lunch (no more than
$0.40), and those over 185 percent paying full price.
The program has undergone several reforms aimed at expanding its coverage and
improving the nutritional content of its meals. The most recent was the Healthy, Hunger-Free
Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA), which mandated more stringent nutritional standards for school
meals and beverages, set maximum calorie limits per meal, strengthened weekly requirements
for fruits and vegetables, and authorized the United States Department of Agriculture to regulate
the nutritional content of all foods sold in schools.2 Additionally, the act expanded coverage of
the program through the Community Eligibility Provision, which allows schools to offer free
meals to all students (known as Universal Free Meals, or UFM).3
Meals served as part of the NSLP typically meet nutrition standards and are healthier than
most alternative meals and snacks available to students through vending machines, snack bars,
fast food outlets, or packed lunches from home (Gordon & Fox, 2007; Fox & Condon, 2012, Au
et al., 2016; Ralston et al., 2017). Students taking advantage of the program consume more
protein, essential nutrients, milk, and whole grains as compared to those that do not, and fewer
desserts, snacks, and other beverages (Bogden, Brizius, & Walker, 2012; Lin et al., 2019).
Although effects vary across studies depending on the data, population, and methodology used,
several studies suggest that the NSLP may improve health outcomes and mitigate the prevalence

2

As of February 2019, some of these changes have been reverse. These include the requirement that schools serve
only whole-grain rich foods and non-flavored milk. The deadline to reduce the amount of sodium in foods served
was also extended (USDA, 2018).
3
Schools can offer UFM through the Community Eligibility Provision if at least 40 percent of students are
categorically eligible for free meals through enrollment in a food or cash assistance program, in the foster care
system, or homelessness. Food and cash assistance programs by which categorical eligibility is determined includes
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and the Food
Distribution Program on Indian Reservations.
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of food insecurity among participating students (Gundersen et al., 2012; Bartfeld, 2015; Smith,
2017). A growing body of evidence also suggests that participation in the program may boost test
scores (Figlio & Winicki, 2005; Hinrichs, 2010; Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019), increase
attendance, and reduce occurrences of disruptive behavior during the school day (Murphy et al.,
1998; Poppendieck, 2010).
Despite these potential benefits, not all students take advantage of school lunch. In 2014,
only 56% of all kindergarten through 12th grade students participated, down from a peak of 60%
in 2010 (Hoynes & Schanzenbach, 2015). While participation is lowest among higher-income
students, a substantial number from lower-income households also do not participate despite
eligibility for free or reduced-price lunches. In 2010, only 79% and 73% of students certified
eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch participated, respectively, and participation was 70% in
urban areas in 2013, where higher concentrations of poverty might be expected. Participation
also declines as students age and is particularly low among middle and high school students (Fox
& Condon, 2012; Carson, 2015).
Several reasons may explain the low and declining participation rates in the program.
First, the price of meals may be cost-prohibitive for those not eligible for free or reduced-price
lunches (Gordon & Fox, 2007; Moore, Hulsey, & Ponza, 2009; Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019).
Second, stigma may deter participation if eating a school lunch signals a student’s
socioeconomic status (Mitcheva & Powell, 2009; Poppendieck, 2010). Third, competition from
foods higher in sugar and fat content sold inside schools but outside of the NSLP (e.g., vending
machines or a la carte options) and off-site vendors (e.g., fast-food restaurants) may divert
students away from school meals (Bhatia, Jones, & Reicker, 2011; Miller et al., 2016). Fourth,
the school environment and related lunch policies—such as cafeteria capacity, time of day lunch

5

is served, length of the lunch line, and amount of time available for eating—might also deter
participation (e.g., Smith, Cunningham-Sabo, & Auld, 2015). Lastly, and widely expressed, is
that the meals served through the program may be unappealing to students, especially as
increased nutrition standards have made meals healthier (Poppendieck, 2010; Woo Baidal &
Taveras, 2014).
While studies have investigated other factors associated with school lunch participation,
the evidence on whether the menus offered might themselves be a determinant is limited and
mostly anecdotal. Nevertheless, school districts nationwide are working to enhance the appeal of
their lunches by reformulating their menus. According to a 2017 survey of over 500 school
district directors from across the country, 60% reported offering at least one menu item that
featured an international flavor and 26% were considering or testing such meals. Just over 87%
reported offering a salad bar, entrée bar, self-service flavor stations, or some other customizable
menu option (School Nutrition Association, 2017). In another survey, 32% of school directors
reported increasing menu options in an effort to boost participation and consumption (Pew and
RWJF, 2016). In this paper, we assess the efficacy of schools adopting new menus to increase
lunch participation.
Literature
Existing literature on the relationship between school menus and student lunch
participation is scarce. Aside from the sensory appeal of the meals offered (e.g., taste and
aesthetics), the effect of adopting a new menu on student lunch participation is unclear and may
vary depending on its particular features. Conventional economic theory suggests that menus
offering more food options are better able to satisfy diverse preferences, leading to increased
take-up of school lunch. Affording student’s greater choice may also enhance their sense of self6

autonomy and satisfaction with their chosen option (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010;
Chernev, Böckenhold, & Goodman; 2015).4 Yet menu variety may still do little to increase
student participation if the food items offered lack appeal or variety alone is not sufficient to
overcome other barriers to participation. Studies investigating the link between food variety and
consumption among children and adolescents are few and present mixed results. In an
experiment involving Dutch children ages 4 to 6, Zeinstra et al. (2010) found no difference in
consumption across those given a choice between two vegetables and those who were not offered
a choice. In contrast, Dominguez et al. (2013) found that Spanish children of the same age who
were given a choice between two vegetables had a higher rate of consumption than those offered
no choice. Altintzoglou, et al. (2015) finds that Norwegian 11 and 12-year olds offered a choice
between two fish meals expressed greater satisfaction with their meal, though consumption was
no different as compared to the group offered no choice. These studies rely on small convenience
samples and were conducted under controlled experimental conditions with a limited set of
options. It is therefore difficult to generalize these results to the cafeteria setting.
Alternatively, as suggested by consumer theory, the novelty of a new menu might serve
to increase student participation, though the effect may be short-lived (McAlister and Pessemier,
1982; Kahn, 1995). However, if students are more comfortable with what they are familiar with,
the introduction of a new menu may disrupt established behaviors and eating patterns leading to
a reduction in participation. For example, when asked how students responded to the
introduction of a healthier menu in 2012, cooks and school food managers from a district in

The literature on “choice overload” also suggests that expanding the number of options available might increase
the cognitive cost of making a choice and induce apprehension, which can deter a decision altogether or leave
students regretful and unsatisfied. However, the circumstances under which increased choice may become
burdensome is unclear and it is unlikely that set of food items often available for lunch is large enough to induce a
significant burden.
4
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Louisiana stated that middle and high school students were disappointed that food items they
were familiar with were no longer offered and were less likely to participate as a result (Murimi
et al., 2015). Conversely, a strand of literature examining the relationship between healthier
school lunches and student participation in the United States found no adverse effects on the
number of meals served, school revenues, or food waste (Cohen et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 2016;
Cullen and Dave, 2016; Andersen, Gallagher, and Ritchie, 2018). These findings would suggest
that students may not respond negatively to changes in school menus. However, these studies fail
to account for pre-existing trends, use coarse measures of lunch participation, or do not account
for other changes at the school or district level which could have influenced how students
responded to new menus.
Convenience may also matter, as qualitative evidence suggests that students are deterred
from participating in lunch by long lunch lines (Smith, Cunningham-Sabo, & Auld, 2015).
Menus allowing students to receive their meals more quickly may therefore encourage
participation, though the opposite could occur if the kinds of meals that might allow for faster
access are also unappealing or lack variety.
This study is the first to investigate the relationship between school menus and lunch
participation on a large-scale and in the school setting, and controls for a host of unobservable
and observable student (e.g., innate traits) and school characteristics (e.g., other food policies)
that might be related to the menus schools choose to serve and lunch participation outcomes.
Although this study can only link menus to taking a lunch, and not consumption explicitly, it
constitutes a substantial improvement over existing research and contributes significantly to the
literature on NSLP participation, particularly as it pertains to the ability of school districts and
individual schools to influence lunch participation.
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School Lunch in NYC
The NYCDOE is the nation’s largest school district, serving over 1.1 million students
across more than 1,800 traditional and charter public schools. The district’s student body is
diverse, with Hispanics, Blacks, Asians, and Whites constituting 41, 26, 16, and 15 percent of
students, respectively. Most students are also economically disadvantaged, with 74 percent
eligible for a free or reduced-price school lunch.5
School meal programs in the district are administered by the Office of Food and Nutrition
Services (OFNS), which operates with a budget of over $550 million, employs over 9,000
people, and serves nearly one million meals and snacks each school day (Perlman, et al., 2012;
Hoffman, O’Hagan, K., & Sompura, 2018).6 Beginning in 2001, NYCDOE implemented a series
of reforms to make its school meals healthier and develop new recipes. As a result, nutrition
standards for school lunches in New York City meet or exceed those required under federal
guidelines. The district has also expanded free meal coverage, notably in academic year 2014,
when it made free lunch available to all reduced price eligible students while raising the cost of a
full price lunch to $1.75 (from $1.50), and in academic years 2015 and 2018, when it introduced
UFM to schools serving grades 6 through 8 and then all schools, respectively.7
The NYCDOE also took steps beginning in 2003 to restrict competitive foods in school
by eliminating all sodas from vending machines and permitting only water, milk, 100% juice,
and low-fat snacks. These efforts were reinforced in 2008 when the city government imposed
additional nutrition restrictions for all foods offered in city agencies, including schools.8 This
5

New York City Department of Education, accessed May 2019: https://on.nyc.gov/2K0hklV
Meals served includes breakfast, lunch, snacks, and after school meals.
7
Prior to the HHFKA, schools in NYC provided free meals to students at certain schools under Provision 2 of the
National School Lunch Act. See Schwartz and Rothbart (2019) for details.
8
These included restrictions on artificial trans-fats, deep-fried foods, sodium levels, and certain sugar-sweetened
beverages.
6
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was followed by additional NYCDOE nutrition restrictions in 2010 for all competitive foods
offered in schools, including fundraisers, bake-sales, a la carte options, and vending machines
(Perlman, et al., 2012). Efforts to regulate competitive foods in schools, such as those taken by
the NYCDOE, have been shown to be associated with lower access to less healthy alternatives to
school provided meals (Merlo et al., 2014).
In 2004, OFNS hired chefs to develop menu items more appealing to students and which
could be prepared in all schools, regardless of kitchen space and equipment (Perlman et al.,
2012).9 Reflecting these goals, OFNS began making available additional lunch menus—each
consisting of a set of meals provided daily based on a service schedule—that schools could serve
starting in 2009 and greatly expanded their choice set beginning in 2012, as shown in Figure 1.
As of 2019, OFNS boasts more than 130 recipes offered across 13 lunch menus.
These menus vary by number of food items (entrées and salads), type of food items (e.g.,
hot vs. cold), their delivery method (e.g., express or service line), and their preparation (e.g.,
“scratch-cooked” or off-site) and can be organized broadly into two categories, standard and
non-standard, that include menus reflecting nationwide trends in changes to school lunch menus.
The set of standard menus are those most often served by middle and high schools and include
more food items and variety (e.g. hot and cold food items as well as culturally diverse meals) as
compared to most other menus. The set of non-standard menus includes the alternative, express,
special needs, early childhood, vegetarian, and food court menus. The set of alternative menus
includes more scratch-cooked meals prepared on-site using raw ingredients and fewer processed
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Appealing to the tastes of its diverse student body is a primary concern. As stated on the OFNS website, the
department invests a “considerable amount of time in…reformulating food items to guarantee…citywide menus that
are specific to the various school divisions…and meet the needs of our students,” and “…to guarantee that the
diverse palates and requests of the 1.1 million NYC students…are met.” Quotes from OFNS website and accessible
at: http://www.schoolfoodnyc.org/MenusAndRecipes/menus.htm
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foods. Express “grab and go” menus offer fewer food items and less variety, and either serve hot
(e.g., burgers) or cold (e.g., deli sandwiches) foods. Special needs menus offer a subset of the
meals offered in the standard menus, as does the early childhood menu, which includes fewer
culturally diverse meals and no pizza. The vegetarian menu serves meals without meat protein.
Lastly, the food court menu offers the greatest variety of foods—with daily offerings of
sandwiches, salads, pizzas, French fries, and popcorn chicken in addition to options from the HS
standard menu—in cafeterias designed to mimic a food court-style environment.10 Among the set
of standard menus are the high school (HS), middle school (MS), and Kindergarten through
eighth grade (K-8) standard menus. Alternative menus include both a HS and K-8 version, as do
the express cold, express hot, and special needs menus.
While there is overlap in the entrees and salads that appear across menus, there are food
items that appear in some but not others. For example, as seen in Figure 2, the HS standard
menu offers 108 food items while the middle school (MS) menu offers 94, of which 87 are
included in the former but seven are not (e.g., “oven roasted turkey & cheese hero”).11
Another source of variation across menus is their food item service schedule. To illustrate
this point, panel A of Figure 3 depicts what is served as part of the HS standard menu in a
typical week. As with most menus, students are offered an entrée, salad, and a side each day.
Panel B then compares what is served as part of the HS standard menu with that in the HS
alternative menu for the same week in the same academic year. Each day, entrées, salads, or both
differ across the two menus. On Monday, students in schools offering the HS standard menu
10

Some food items served as part of the food court menu are displayed as hot or cold options under heat lamps or in
refrigerated display cases, which allows students to self-select meals. In some cases, this menu was accompanied by
changes to the dining area, such as new seating arrangements (e.g., booths and round tables instead of rectangular
tables) or renovations of the floors, walls, and lighting of the cafeteria.
11
Officials at OFNS affirmed that contents of menus were relatively stable between school years 2013-2014 and
2017-2018, after which there have been substantial changes, such as the discontinued use of processed meats in
school meals beginning in the 2019-2020 school year.
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were offered a “celery and apple salad” while those serving the HS alternative menu were
offered the “Asian slaw salad.” However, on some days, like Tuesday, the same food item
appears across both menus—in this case the “turkey cheeseburger.” As seen in Figure 4, the
number of food items available on any given day may also vary, with the standard set of menus
offering more options as compared to most non-standard menus.
School principals decide which menus to serve their students. Although nutritional
standards and menus are set by OFNS and apply to all schools, principals have substantial
discretion over their school’s food policies. School principals decide what (e.g. cafeteria-based
programs), when (e.g., time of day), and who (e.g., grade levels) to serve. They also decide
whether their students can leave school during lunch and if snack and junk foods are permissible
on school grounds and where and when they can be eaten (Leardo et al., 2018). According to
OFNS, school principals typically choose which menu to serve early in the academic year.12
These features of the NYC school district—the variation in menus across and within
schools over time in a single district with uniform nutrition and competitive food policies—
together with its size and diversity make it an ideal setting to study the link between menus and
lunch participation on a large scale and the efficacy of introducing new menus as a policy
instrument. Insights gleaned from NYC can guide other districts and school administrators
considering introducing new menus and better inform those already doing so.
Data and Measures
This study uses unique, richly detailed longitudinal data on NYC students and schools for
academic years 2013-2014 (AY 2014) to 2017-2018 (AY 2018) provided by the NYCDOE and
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According to officials at OFNS, principals can choose which menus to serve for any reason, including personal
preference, though practical considerations such as staff workload, kitchen capacity, equipment, and student’s tastes
play a significant role.

12

OFNS. Specifically, we focus on students in schools with point-of-service (POS) systems
tracking meal transactions to facilitate the construction of our lunch participation measures.13
Student characteristics include race/ethnicity, gender, participation in special education
services, primary language spoken at home, certified eligibility for free or reduced priced lunch,
daily attendance, school attended, and, for a large subset of students, weight, height, and daily
breakfast and lunch transactions. We create two measures of lunch participation. The first is an
“ever participate in lunch” (EverLP1) binary variable that reflects the propensity for lunch
participation and takes a value of 1 if a student has at least one lunch transaction in an AY and 0
otherwise. We further supplement this with binary variables capturing at least 10 (EverLP10) and
twenty (EverLP20) transactions in an AY. The annual “lunch participation rate” (LPrate) variable
captures lunch participation intensity and is measured as the percent of days a student
participated in school lunch of all days they attended school. It is constructed by dividing the
number of lunch transactions a student had in an AY by the number of days they attended school
in that same year and multiplying by 100. We create measures for participation in school
breakfast similarly (EverBP1, EverBP10, EverBP20, and BPrate).
Student race/ethnicity is captured by a set of binary variables that take a value of 1 if a
student is Asian or Other (e.g., Native American or Pacific Islander), Hispanic, Black, or White,
and 0 otherwise. Gender, participation in special education services, and primary language
spoken at home are measured as binary variables that take values of 1 if a student is female
(Female), has an individualized education program (SWD), or speaks a primary language other
than English at home (Non-English at Home), and 0 otherwise. The free and reduced-price lunch
(FRPL) measure is time-invariant and takes a value of 1 if a student was certified eligible for a
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Point-of-service systems require that students input an identification number as they receive their school meals,
thereby creating a record of their lunch transaction.
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free or reduced-price lunch in any year between 2001 and 2018 (Ever FRPL) and 0 otherwise.14
Annual student attendance is measured as the number of days present divided by the total
number of school days multiplied by 100. Data on schools attended is used to construct a binary
variable that takes a value of 1 if a student attends a different school than in the previous year
(New School), and 0 otherwise.15 Data on student weight and height is used to calculate student’s
Body Mass Index (BMI). Weight variables include BMI measured as z-scores and normalized by
grade-year (zBMI), the natural logarithm of BMI (ln(BMI)), and indicator variables for
underweight (BMI percentile ≤ 5th), overweight (85th < BMI percentile ≤ 95th), or obese (95th <
BMI percentile), and 0 otherwise, based on age- and sex-specific growth charts from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.
School characteristics include the number of students enrolled at the school (Enrollment),
the school’s principal, UFM status, and menu served.16 To proxy for principal decisions that may
influence lunch participation, a binary variable that takes a value of 1 the year a school gets a
new principal and 0 otherwise is included (New Principal). School UFM status is measured by a
binary variable that takes a value of 1 the years a school provides all students with free meals and
0 otherwise (UFM). We create a variable for years a school does not provide all students with
free meals similarly (No UFM).
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This measure better captures the economic disadvantage faced by some students in NYC and protects against
potential under-reporting of individual eligibility for meal subsidies among students in UFM schools whose
eligibility status cannot be determine through direct certification (i.e., by enrollment in another means tested
program) or whose households may no longer submit forms used to determine eligibility status. See Schwartz and
Rothbart (2019) for additional details.
15
In our main analysis, we use a sample of students that do not change schools and for whom variation in exposure
to new menus is due to their schools choosing to adopt a new menu. As a robustness check, we also run the analysis
including students who change schools and for whom variation in exposure to a new menu may be due to their
schools adopting a new menu or them attending a new school that serves a menu that differs from their previous
schools. We elaborate on this further below.
16
We have menu data as of December 31st for AY 2014, and October 31st for each subsequent year. According to
officials at OFNS, most schools have selected their menus by October and rarely make changes thereafter, but if a
school not identified as having introduced a new menu in a particular year actually did so then our estimates will be
biased downwards. We use student and school identifiers to match students to menus.

14

Our key variables capture the relationship between school menus and lunch participation.
A binary variable Post New Menu measures the overall effect of adopting a new menu and takes
a value of 1 in the year a student is exposed to a menu that differs from what they were served
the previous year and each year thereafter, and 0 otherwise. For example, if a student was served
the HS standard menu in AY 2014 and the HS alternative menu in AY 2015-2017, Post New
Menu would take a value of 0 in the former and a value 1 one for each of the years in the latter
period. To allow the effect of a new menu to vary over time, we create binary variables Post New
Menu 1st AY and Post New Menu gt. 1 AY (where “gt.” Denotes “greater than”) that take a value
of 1 in the first year of a new menu and two, three, or four years after, respectively, and 0
otherwise. Using the previous example, Post New Menu 1st AY would take a value of 1 in AY
2015 and 0 in both AY2016 and 2017, while Post New Menu gt. 1 AY would take a value of 0 in
AY 2015 and 1 in each of AY2016 and 2017.
As an extension to our main analysis, we create four other measures. The first two are a
binary variables Non-Standard Menu and Standard Menu that take a value of 1 if a student is
served any one of the non-standard (for the former) or standard (for the latter) menus, and 0
otherwise. The other two variables are an interaction of Post New Menu with Non-Standard
Menu and Standard Menu, and capture the effect of a new non-standard or standard menu.
Lastly, to investigate differential responsiveness by the type of menu offered, we create a set of
indicator variables for each menu that appears in our analytic samples. These variables capture
whether a student is served an alternative menu, express menu, food court menu, K-8 standard
menu, MS standard menu, or HS standard menu.
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Analytic Samples
The analytic “stable school” sample includes students in grades 6 through 12 attending
traditional public schools with POS systems serving a single menu and excludes students in
charter and special education schools, and those who change schools.17,18 To leverage the
longitudinal nature of the data, students must also be observed in at least two years. An
alternative “Full” sample includes students who change schools between academic years during
the sample period.19
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics pooled across AY 2014-2018, beginning with those
for all NYC middle and high school students in traditional public schools in column 1, those not
included in the stable school and full samples in columns 3 and 6, and for the stable school and
full samples in columns 2 and 5. The stable school sample includes roughly 330,000 unique
students across 787 schools and 890,000 student-year observations. Reflecting the diversity of
the district, the stable school sample is majority-minority and nearly half of all students speak a
primary language other than English at home. Almost all students have been certified eligible for
a free or reduced-price lunch at least once. The full sample is similar to both the stable school
sample and the population of all students and includes roughly 480,000 unique students across
885 schools and over 1.4 million student-year observations. Neither the students in the stable
school sample nor the full sample are meaningfully different from their excluded counterparts, as
shown in columns 4 and 7. For each of the two samples, Table 2 presents descriptive statistics
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Appendix Table A1 depicts the distribution of schools serving middle and high school students with POS systems
across the sample period. Point-of-service systems were introduced in the mid-2000’s and the number of schools
adopting them has readily increased since. Students in schools with POS systems are not, however, qualitatively
different than those in non-POS schools on observable characteristics, as seen in columns 2 and 3 of Appendix
Table A2, nor are they substantively different from the general population of students.
18
To be included in the sample, observations must also have valid attendance (non-missing or non-zero) so that
lunch participation measures can be constructed, but this condition only drops a very small fraction (<0.01%).
19
This sample still excludes students who switch schools within an AY since the precise timing of a school switch
cannot be determined. Less than 1% of the sample switches schools within an academic year.
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for students who are ever and never exposed to a new menu. The characteristics shown in
columns 3 and 6 do not reveal any meaningful differences across the two types of students in
either sample.
Table 3 shows the variation in the two samples. The average student is observed roughly
three times in both samples. Either by switching schools or their school deciding to make
changes between academic years, 33 percent of the full sample and 7 percent of the stable school
sample experience at least one new menu, while about a third of students in both samples get a
new principal. As seen in Table 4, there is substantial variation in the types of menus served
across and within schools over time in the stable school sample between AY 2015 and AY 2018.
Turning again to Table 2, roughly 87 percent of students in the stable school sample
participate in lunch at least once, 72 percent at least 10 times, and 65 percent at least 20 times in
an AY across the sample period. The average lunch participation rate across all years is 40
percent, though there is substantial heterogeneity across students from different backgrounds, as
shown in Figure 5 for AY 2017. As seen in Panel A, Asian or Other students are most likely to
participate in school lunch, followed by Hispanic, Black, and White students. Lunch
participation is about 10 percentage points higher among students who primarily speak a
language other than English at home as compared to those who speak English at home.20 Male
students are eight percentage-points more likely to participate in school lunch as compared to
females. Students never certified eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch have the lowest
participation rate at 20 percent. Lunch participation also declines as students age—from over 50
20

The relatively higher lunch participation rates for Asians/Other students in New York, as compared to nationally,
may be related to their nativity status, as students from immigrant backgrounds may be more likely to participate in
school lunch. While we do not know students’ place of birth, we proxy for this using primary language spoken at
home. Among Asian/Other students, 68% primarily speak a language other than English at home. This figure is also
high among Hispanic students at 64%, but low for Black and White students, at 10% and 34%, respectively. Among
Asian/Other, Hispanic, Black, and White students who primarily speak English at home, lunch participation rates are
37%, 40%, 38%, and 25%, respectively.
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percent in grade six to under 30 percent in grade 12—with a steep drop-off between grades eight
and nine, as shown in Panel B.
Empirical Strategy
Baseline Model
The centerpiece of our empirical work is a student fixed-effects model linking lunch
participation to new menus as follows:
(1) Participationist = β0 + β1Post New Menuist + β2Xist + β3Zst + δg + λt + αi + εi,s,t
where subscripts i, s, and t represent student, school, and academic year, respectively. When
investigating the association between a new menu and propensity for lunch participation (i.e.,
likelihood of participating in lunch), the outcome—Participationist—is EverLP. For lunch
participation intensity (i.e., frequency of lunch participation), the outcome of interest is LPrate.
Post New Menuist captures the overall effect of a new menu. Xist and Zst are vectors of timevarying student and school characteristics including primary language spoken at home and
participation in special education services, and UFM status, total enrollment, and new principal,
respectively. Grade, year, and student fixed-effects are represented by δg, λt, and αi, respectively.
Standard errors are clustered by school as decisions regarding menus are made at the school level
and students are clustered in schools.21 To estimate the effect of a new menu over time, we
estimate the same model substituting Post New Menu 1st AY and Post New Menu gt. 1 AYist for
Post New Menuist.
We estimate this model on the stable school sample, which also controls for timeinvariant school characteristics since students in this sample do not change schools. Estimated
coefficients will capture causal effects if school adoptions of new menus are unrelated to student
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We make these clustering choices following Cameron and Miller (2015).
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characteristics and if there are no other concurrent changes in school policies, practices, and
characteristics that might affect lunch participation rates. The student fixed-effects serve to
control for unobserved student and school specific time-invariant factors that might influence
their participation in lunch.22 The addition of controls help to account or proxy for important
time varying factors, such as changes in the price of school lunch, cafeteria capacity, and
changes in lunch policies. Grade fixed-effects help to control for factors common to all students
in a particular grade that may influence lunch participation (e.g., taste preferences at a particular
age) while year fixed-effects help to control for shocks that affect all students in a particular year
(e.g., food fads). We show evidence to support the assumption that the adoption of new menus is
unrelated to school characteristics below.
We do not include weight controls in our primary specification to avoid dropping
observations, as we do not have data for roughly 20% of the students in both our full and stable
school samples.23 As a robustness check, we estimate a model including controls for whether a
student is underweight, overweight, or obese. Additionally, we also estimate the baseline model
on the more inclusive full sample of students, which includes students who change schools
between academic years. For this analysis, we amend the specification above to include school
fixed-effects and a control for school changes.24,25
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At the student level, these characteristics may include intrinsic motivation for seeking out substitutes for school
meals or family background. At the school level, these may include the social setting, time of day lunch is served
and how long students are given to eat, or whether school faculty and staff spend time in the cafeteria and eat with
students, among other lunch practices.
23
Dropping these observations also eliminates much of the variation in new menus. In the stable school sample, we
lose 15% of students exposed to a new menu.
24
As another robustness check, we substitute school fixed-effects for student fixed-effects in the baseline model. In
these specifications, the vector of control variables also includes student race and ethnicity, gender, and FRPL
status.
25
As a falsification test, we also estimate the baseline model substituting lunch participation outcomes with
measures of breakfast participation.
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Heterogeneity Analysis
The differences in lunch participation rates across students documented above also
suggests that the relationship between new menus and lunch participation may vary across race
and ethnicity, gender, economic status, and grade. Some menus may, for example, better cater to
the taste preferences of particular demographics by offering healthier or more culturally diverse
meals. It may also be that older or higher-income students with greater access to school lunch
alternatives may react differently to menus that offer greater daily variety as compared to their
younger or lower-income peers. We explore differential responsiveness to new menus by
estimating the baseline model separately for each set of characteristics and interacting Post New
Menu with each characteristic as follows:
(2) Participationist = β0 + β1Post New Menuist*Student Characteristicsist + β2Xist + β3Zst + δg + λt
+ αi + εi,s,t
The specifications for race and ethnicity include interactions for Asian/Other, Hispanic, Black
and White. The specification for gender includes interactions with binary variables for male and
female. The specification for FRPL status includes interactions with binary variables for never
FRPL and ever FRPL. Lastly, the specification for grade includes interactions with binary
variables for students in middle and high school.
Exploring Moderating Factors, Mechanisms, and Indirect Effects
As an extension to our main analysis, we explore complementarities between the
introduction of new menus and UFM, which not only eliminates prices but may also reduce the
stigma associated with school lunch (Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019). If the cost of meals or stigma
associated with school lunch constitute major barriers to participation, then students may be most
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responsive to new menus in schools that have adopted UFM. To examine this, we estimate the
following model:
(3) Participationist = β0 + β1Post New Menuist*UFMist + β2Post New Menuist*No UFMist + β3Xist +
β4Zst + δg + λt + αi + εi,s,t
We also explore potential mechanisms by examining the relationship between specific
menu types and lunch participation. We do this in two ways. First, we assess the extent to which
the adoption of non-standard menus drive the relationship between new menus and participation.
While the standard menus offer a greater number of food items and more variety than most of the
non-standard menus, the latter have unique features that might make them more or less appealing
to students. We do this as follows:
(3) Participationist = β0 + β1Non-Standard Menuist + β2Post New Menuist*Standard Menuist +
β3Post New Menuist*Non-Standard Menuist + β4Xist + β5Zst + δg + λt + αi + εi,s,t
Second, we estimate models relating specific menu types to participation using indicator
variables for HS standard, MS standard, K-8 standard, alternative, express, and food court
menus.
For our final extension, we examine potential linkages between new menus and
attendance and weight outcomes by substituting lunch participation outcomes in the baseline
model with measures of attendance and weight.
Main Results
New Menus and Lunch Participation
Regression results for the relationship between new menus and the propensity for lunch
participation (EverLP) are shown in columns 1 through 3 of Table 5. As seen in panel A, the
adoption of a new menu is associated with a 3-percentage point increase in the likelihood of a
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student participating in school lunch at least once and a 4-percentage point increase for
participating at least 10 times. The estimated effect for the likelihood of participating at least 20
times is positive and similar in magnitude though statistically insignificant. Panel B presents
estimates for the effect of a new menu over time. The first year of a new menu is associated with
an increase in the likelihood of participating at least once, 10 times, and 20 times in an AY by
2.7, 4.1, and 3.4 percentage points. These effects may persist in later years as the likelihood of
participating at least once is often larger in the years after adoption. Column 4 presents the
results for lunch participation intensity (LPrate). The adoption of a new menu is associated with
a 2.5 percentage point increase in lunch participation rates overall. As seen in panel B, the effect
is concentrated in the first year of an adoption, when lunch participation rates increase by 2.6
percentage points on average.
These estimates are meaningfully large, constituting a 4 to 6 percent increase in the share
of students participating in school lunch at least once and ten times in an academic year relative
to baseline rates of 85 and 71 percent. The estimates are similarly large for lunch participation
rates, translating to a 6.5 percent increase in lunch participation rates among all students in the
sample. Together, these results suggest that the introduction of a new menu increases the
propensity for and intensity of lunch participation. Although imprecisely estimated, the analysis
of the effect of new menus over time suggests that their effect may persist over time, implying
that specific features of menus may be important and that novelty may not be the sole
mechanism involved.
Differential Responsiveness to New Menus Across Students
Figure 6 present the results for the propensity and intensity of participation by student
race and ethnicity, gender, FRPL status, and grade. The adoption of new menus is associated
22

with increases in the propensity for participation by 3.2 percentage points among Black students
and 8.6 percentage points among White students, while estimates for the participation of Asian
and Hispanic students are smaller and statistically insignificant. The associated increase in the
propensity for participation among females is 4.3 percentage points, twice that of males, and 14
percentage points among never FRPL students, seven times that of students ever certified for
FRPL. New menus seem to have no differential effect on middle school students but increase the
propensity for participation among high school students by 5.5 percentage points.26
Turning to lunch participation intensity, the results show increases of 4 and 5 percentage
points among Black and White students, respectively. Lunch participation rates also increase by
about 3 percentage points for male and high school students. As before, the largest effects are
observed among never FRPL students, whose lunch participation rates increase by 7.5
percentage points. To put these estimates into perspective, the effect of a new menu on
participation intensity for White and never FRPL students is roughly half to two-thirds the size
of the effect that UFM has been found to have on lunch participation rates among “non-poor”
students (11 percentage points) and on par with or larger than the effect on “poor” students (5.4
percentage points) (Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019). These substantial increases suggest that these
students may be better served when their schools introduce new menus.27
Furthermore, participation in school lunch has been found to be higher among those
eligible for free or reduced price meals relative to those not, younger students, and, in other
contexts, Hispanics and Blacks relative to Whites and Asians (Dunifon and Kowaleski-Jones,
2003; Newman & Ralston, 2006; Gordon & Fox, 2007; Fox & Condon, 2012). Given the
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We find similar results when using EverLP10 and EverLP20 as dependent variables. Results available upon request.
Regression results presented in Appendix Table A14. We also run the analysis on the full sample. Results are
largely consistent and shown in Appendix Table A15.
27
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benefits that school lunch may have for student health and academic outcomes, heterogeneity in
lunch participation could have substantial implications for disparities in the growth and
development of children and adolescents from different backgrounds. The results therefore also
suggest that offering new menus, perhaps those satisfying a broader range of tastes, could be one
way that school districts can close racial and socioeconomic gaps in lunch participation and,
potentially, disparities in academic and health outcomes.
Extensions
Responsiveness to New Menus in UFM Schools
Table 6 presents the results for the relationship between new menus, UFM, and lunch
participation. The introduction of UFM has a large and statistically significant positive effect on
lunch participation, increasing the propensity for participating by 8 to 9 percentage points and
the intensity of participation by about 4.5 percentage points. The estimated coefficients for the
effect of a new menu in schools without UFM across the different lunch participation measures
are positive but statistically insignificant and qualitatively smaller than their counterparts for
schools offering free meals to all students, wherein the introduction of a new menu increases the
propensity for participation by 4 to 5 percentage points and the intensity of participation by
roughly 3 percentage points. One implication may be that the introduction of free meals could
make students more responsive to trying new foods, either by eliminating prices, reducing
stigma, or both. However, the two sets of coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from
one another and so effects of new menus in non-UFM schools cannot be ruled out.28
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We also run the analysis on the full sample. The results remain consistent and are shown in Appendix Table A16.
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Relationship between Specific Menu Types and Lunch Participation
We explore potential mechanisms underlying the link between new menus and lunch
participation by exploring how the relationship varies across the different types of menus
offered. We start by examining whether the adoption of new non-standard menus drives our
main results. The results in Table 7 suggest that much of the relationship between new menus
and lunch participation may be driven by the adoption of new non-standard menus, which is
associated with a 6 to 7 percentage point increase in the propensity for participating and a 6.4
percentage point increase in the intensity of participation. The null hypothesis of equality for the
coefficients on the two interaction terms are rejected at conventional significance levels for the
measures of participating at least one and 10 times in a school year. The estimates for
participating at least 20 times and lunch participate rates are not, however, statistically different
from their counterparts for the introduction of a new standard menu, which are positive but
statistically insignificant and qualitatively smaller.29
Figure 7 shows the results further disaggregating menus by specific types.30 Relative to
the HS Standard menu, the most common menu served across schools in the analytic samples,
the food court menu is associated with large increases both in the propensity and intensity of
participation. This might be expected as the food court menu offers several likely quite popular
options (e.g., pizza and popcorn chicken) daily in addition to what is served as part of the HS
standard menu, which indicates that either the type of meals offered, variety, or both are
important factors for inducing greater lunch participation. Furthermore, the food court menu’s

29

Testing the null hypothesis of equality for the coefficients on the two interaction terms produces p-values of 0.08
for EverLP1, 0.02 for EverLP10, 0.16 for EverLP20, and 0.10 for LPrate, respectively. We also ran the analysis on the
full sample and find similar results, as shown in Appendix Table A17.
30
Regression results presented in Appendix Table A18.

25

self-service feature might also add to the appeal of school lunch by providing students with a
greater sense of autonomy and reducing wait times in lines. In schools that also underwent
renovations, changes to the cafeteria environment may have also mattered.
Though imprecisely estimated, the magnitude and direction of the coefficients for the
express menus across all measures of participation likely rule out the potential for any positive
effects from these menus. While “grab and go” options may reduce wait times for lunch in the
cafeteria, these menus offer a limited set of options comprised mostly of hot and cold sandwiches
or salads that may be, or become over time, unappealing to many students. Similarly, though
imprecisely estimated, alternative menus serving more scratch-cooked and less processed foods
may increase the propensity for participation. Together, these results suggest that the type of
meals served and how they’re prepared may also matter.
Consequences for Other Outcomes
In addition to lunch participation, new menus may also have notable indirect effects.
Offering a new menu may entice students to attend school more regularly so as to take advantage
of school lunch. Of particular concern, lunch participation induced by the introduction of new
menus may have consequences for weight outcomes through consumption of school meals.
Table 8 presents the results for the relationship between new menus, attendance, and weight.
The introduction of a new menu is not associated with changes in attendance rates. Importantly,
new menus are also unrelated to worse weight outcomes.31 These results are consistent with those

31

It is worth noting that height and weight measurements are captured in the first three months of fall for roughly
half of students. As such, the results for the weight outcomes may reflect only short run associations. Results were
consistent when restricting the analysis to students whose weight and height data was collected in the months after
December. Results available upon request. We also run the analysis on the full sample and find similar results, as
shown in Appendix Table A19.
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of Schwartz and Rothbart (2019), which found the introduction of UFM to have no effect on
attendance and no evidence of adverse effects for weight outcomes.
Probing the Main Results
Robustness Checks
We test the robustness of the main results in four ways. First, we explore the sensitivity
of our findings to sample composition. To assess the generalizability of our findings to a larger
population of students, we expand the sample to include those who change schools between
academic years and re-estimate the student fixed-effects models above. In this more inclusive
sample, the effect of a new menu is identified by variation in exposure to new menus within
students over time due both to their schools adopting new menus and students changing schools
between academic years. As seen in Table A3 of the Appendix, the results are similar. To
further test the sensitivity of our results to sample composition, we restrict the stable school
sample to those students who ever experience a new menu. If students who are ever exposed to a
new menu differ from those who are not, our initial impact estimates may be spurious. As shown
in Table A4, the estimates for this smaller sample are unsurprisingly less precise but remain
positive. As a last check, we restrict the stable school and full samples to students with a history
of lunch participation—defined as having participated in school lunch at least once in period t1—and rerun the analysis for lunch participation intensity, again finding similar results as seen in
Table A5.
Second, we employ school fixed-effects instead of student fixed-effects. While the
student fixed-effects models estimated above rely on variation in exposure to new menus within
students over time, school fixed effects models are identified based on new menu adoptions
within schools over time. In the stable school sample, 3,904 students are first observed the year
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their school adopts a new menu, but do not experience a new menu thereafter. In the school
fixed-effects models using the stable school sample, these students are now treated as being
exposed to a new menu. The results are shown in Table A6 and remain consistent though
estimated with less precision. We repeat this exercise for schools in the full sample, treating
students as exposed to a new menu if the school they are attending adopts a new menu, and find
similar results as seen in Table A7.
Third, we include weight control variables for whether a student is underweight, or
overweight or obese. Table A8 presents the results. Although the sample changes due to missing
data for roughly a fifth of students, the results remain consistent. Lastly, to determine whether
our key findings are driven by cafeteria renovations rather than adoption of new menus, we
restrict the stable school sample to exclude exposure to the food court menu, which was
sometimes coupled with changes to the food environment. Although we lose substantial variation
in this smaller sample, the results, presented in Table A9, remain consistent with our key
findings, though the effect on lunch participate intensity is smaller and statistically insignificant.
The robustness of our results to alternative samples, identifying assumptions, and model
specifications lend support to a causal interpretation of our impact estimates.
Do Observables Predict New Menus?
A causal interpretation of our main impact estimates requires the identifying assumption
that new menu adoptions at the school level are unrelated to student characteristics and lunch
participation. To test the plausibility of this assumption, models with school-fixed effects are
estimated using time-varying school level characteristics in period t to predict the adoption of a
new menu in period t+1:
New Menu,s,t+1 = β0 + θStudent Compositions,t + λYeart + αs + εs,t
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Where “Student Composition” variables are school level aggregates of the student variables
defined above. We do this for all schools in the stable school sample and those with no new
menu adoption in period t.32 Qualitatively small and statistically insignificant estimates would
provide support for a causal interpretation of our main results.
The regression results at the school level for the adoption of a new menu are presented in
Appendix Table A10. The estimates are qualitatively small across both specifications,
particularly the coefficients on the measures for EverLP and LPrate, which are near zero. The Fstatistics for the joint significance of the time-varying variables are also small.
It may also be problematic if particular types of students are more or less likely to be
exposed to a new menu, as that might suggest selection into schools. Parents are unlikely to
know in advance of the academic year if principals will decide to introduce a new menu or to
prioritize school meals—among all school characteristics—when choosing schools for their
children. Nevertheless, we examine whether student characteristics can predict exposure to a
new menu by repeating the above test at the student level. The results are shown in appendix
Table A11. Again, the estimates are close to zero and mostly statistically insignificant, with low
F-statistics.33

32

We also run models including variables for percent of students in each of grades 7 through 12, enrollment, linear
and quadratic terms for principal tenure, adoption of UFM in period t+1, and new principal in period t+1. Estimates
in these models remain qualitatively small and statistically insignificant with low F-statistics for joint significance.
Additionally, we perform this test restricting the analysis to only those schools that ever adopt new menus. Though
the coefficients in this smaller sample are less precisely estimated and thus statistically insignificant, they remain
qualitatively small. Results available upon request.
33
We run the student level analysis including indicator variables for underweight, overweight, and obese. Results
remain qualitatively small and statistically insignificant with low F-statistics for joint significance. We also run the
analysis restricting the stable school sample to students who are ever exposed to a new menu. Again, estimates are
qualitatively small and statistically insignificant, with low F-statistics for joint significance. Results available upon
request. Lastly, we find similar results when we run the analysis using only school fixed-effects and including
controls for student race and ethnicity. Results available upon request.
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The size of the coefficients and statistical insignificance of estimates across both sets of
models suggest that school and student characteristics do not predict menu changes, thereby
further boosting confidence in a causal interpretation of the main results.
Falsification test
If the link between a new menu adoption and student lunch participation is causal, then a
future new menu adoption should have no impact on current outcomes and estimates should be
statistically insignificant. Otherwise, our estimates may be reflecting changes in participation
that pre-date and perhaps precipitate a new menu adoption. We test by recoding our “Post New
Menu” variable to take a value of one in the year prior to a new menu adoption, “Early Post New
Menu,” and re-run the analysis as above. Since this new variable conflates an incorrect and
correct timing of a new menu adoption, we would expect the estimates to be qualitatively smaller
than the estimates from our main specification, statistically insignificant, or both. As seen in
Panel A of Table A12, estimates are smaller and statistically insignificant. Examining the effect
overtime in Panel B reveals statistically significant estimates in line with those above for “Early
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY,” which reflects the correct timing of a new menu adoption.
Additionally, we examine the relationship between a new menu and student participation
in school breakfast. Since the menus considered in this analysis pertain to lunch, it would be
surprising if we found similar effects on breakfast participation. We rerun the baseline model
substituting the lunch participation outcomes for measures of breakfast participation and present
the results in Table A13. As expected, a new lunch menu is not related to breakfast
participation. These tests are further evidence in support of a causal interpretation of our key
findings.
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Conclusions
As the second largest food assistance program in the United States, the NSLP can
improve nutritional intake and reduce the prevalence of food insecurity among children and
adolescents. Participating in school lunch is also associated with better academic outcomes,
which benefits both students and schools. However, realizing these benefits requires that students
participate, but nearly half of all school-aged students do not take advantage of the program. In
response to common criticism that meals served by schools are unappealing and therefore
deterring student participation, school districts nationwide have increased efforts to reformulate
their menus. Yet the link between menus and lunch participation has to date not been rigorously
investigated. This paper begins to fill this gap.
Using unique, detailed longitudinal data on students, schools, and lunch menus in NYC,
this study suggests that introducing new menus increases student participation in school lunch.
Students who are exposed to new menus are more likely to participate in school lunch and
participate more frequently. These results are robust to different samples, identifying
assumptions, and model specifications, thereby encouraging a causal interpretation of the results.
Furthermore, stratifying the analysis by student characteristics suggests increases in participation
among Black, White, female, higher income, and high school students—all groups with low
participation rates in New York City. New menus may therefore help to close demographic and
socioeconomic gaps in lunch participation.
Exploring the relationship between new menus and UFM suggests that the effect may be
driven primarily by students in schools offering free meals, which could indicate that prices or
stigma constitute a barrier to lunch participation that the introduction of new menus alone cannot
overcome. Effects in non-UFM schools could not be ruled out, however. Disaggregating the
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analysis by specific menu types reveals that what is served, how it is served, and the environment
in which it is served also matters, and that innovative non-standard menus may be more
effective. The food court menu—offering the greatest variety, daily access to popular food items,
self-service stations, and, in some cases, including cafeteria renovations—is associated with the
greatest increase in lunch participation. The alternative menus—offering more scratch cooked
and less processed meals—may also increase the share of students participating, though likely
not how often they participate. In contrast, the express menus serving mostly hot and cold
sandwiches are associated with lower participation. Together, these results suggest that the
variety, type, and preparation of meals served as part of menus matter, but that the method and
environment in which they are served is also important. We plan to explore these nuances further
in future work. Lastly, we find no evidence that new menus are related to attendance or adverse
weight outcomes.
While New York City offers a unique opportunity to study the relationship between
school menus and student lunch participation, it is worth noting that the findings of this study
may not be generalizable to other contexts. Although the New York City school district reflects
the growing diversity of the United States’ middle and high school student population and has
implemented innovative approaches to school meals similar to those trending nationwide, it
enjoys economies of scale that other, smaller districts may not have. To the extent that scale
matters, the results presented in this study may be most applicable to other large school districts
or groups of districts that have formed purchasing cooperatives. Arguably, however, the insights
offered in this study can help school officials make more informed decisions about their lunch
programs and provides evidence in support of the efforts that many are currently taking to
reformulate their menus.
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To summarize, this paper presents the first large-scale, rigorous evidence on the link
between school menus and lunch participation, and suggests that the efforts of school districts
nationwide to introduce new menus may prove fruitful. However, our findings also suggest
reformulated menus alone are not a panacea, and that the cost of meals to students and features
of menus and the cafeteria environment warrant serious consideration. Furthermore, while it is
important to get students to participate in school lunch, it is also important that they make the
appropriate dietary choices as they go through the lunch line (e.g., Toossi, 2017). Future work
should also assess the effect that new menus have on the student’s dietary choices.
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Figures & Tables
Figure 1. Lunch Menus Offered by Schools by Year

Note: Figure depicts the lunch menus available to schools by year as listed on the OFNS website. Dark
blue bars indicate menu availability. The food court menu available in years 2008-2011 differs from that
introduced in 2018. “HS” denotes high school, “MS” denotes middle school, and “K-8” denotes
kindergarten through eighth grade. “X” marks menu availability.
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Figure 2. Overlap across Menus in the Types of Food Items Offered
Menu

HS
Standard

HS
Alternative

HS Standard
HS Alternative
HS Express Cold
HS Express Hot
MS Standard
K-8 Standard
K-8 Alternative
K-8 Express Cold
K-8 Express Hot

108
52
11
38
87
75
45
12
45

65
9
19
49
48
49
10
21

HS
Express
Cold

HS
Express
Hot

21
5
13
12
10
20
6

40
36
32
13
5
34

MS
Standard

K-8
Standard

K-8
Alternative

94
80
43
14
44

83
43
13
41

54
11
19

K-8
Express
Cold

K-8
Express
Hot

24
6

48

Note: Figures in the diagonal cells represent the total number of food items in a menu. Figures in other
cells represent the number of food items that appear on any two menus. Data for AY 2017.
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Figure 3. Menu Service Schedules
Panel A.

Panel B.

Note: Panel A depicts food items served as part of the HS standard menu for the week of May 1st
through May 5th of 2017. Panel B depicts food items served across the HS standard and alternative
menus for the same week in 2017.
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Figure 4. Average Number of Food Items Available Daily Across Menus

Note: Figure depicts the average number of food items offered daily for lunch across menu types for
AY2017.

37

Figure 5. Differences in Lunch Participation Rates Across Students
Panel A: By Student Characteristics
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Panel B: By Grade
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Note: Descriptive statistics for AY2017
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Grade 10

Grade 11

Grade 12

Figure 6. Differential Responsive to New Menus by Student Characteristics

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as
school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Confidence intervals are shown at the 90% level.
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Figure 7. Relationship between Specific Menu Types and Lunch Participation

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as
school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Reference category in each is the HS standard
menu. Confidence intervals are shown at the 90% level.
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Variable
Hispanic
Asian/Other
Black
White
Non-English at Home
Female
Ever FRPL
SWD
Attendance Rate
In UFM School

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Analytic Samples
All in
Stable
Not in
Diff.
Full
NYC
School
Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
.40
.39
.40
-.01
.39
.19
.20
.20
.00
.21
.26
.26
.26
.00
.25
.15
.15
.15
.00
.15
.47
.46
.47
-.01
.47
.50
.49
.49
.00
.50
.91
.91
.91
-.01
.91
.14
.14
.14
.00
.14
83
84
82
2.00
85
.45
.42
.49
-.07
.49

Not in
Sample
(6)
.41
.17
.28
.14
.46
.49
.90
.14
78
.41

Students
Observations
Schools

844,216
2,331,963
1,013

365,978
642,762
1013

334,126
889,613
787

510,090
1,255,294
1013

478,238
1,406,789
885

Diff.
(7)
-.01
.04
-.03
.01
.01
.01
.01
-.01
7.00
.08

Note: Descriptive statistics pooled across AY 2014-2018. Column 1 presents statistics for all grade 6-12 students attending traditional public
schools in NYC. Columns 2 and 5 present statistics for students in the stable school and full samples, respectively. Columns 3 and 6 do so for
those not included in the samples. Columns 4 and 7 present the differences between students included and excluded from the samples.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Ever and Never New Menu Students in Analytic Samples
Exposure to a New Menu
Stable School Sample
Full Sample
Ever
Never
Diff.
Ever
Never
Diff.
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
LPrate
40
40
0.00
41
40
1.00
EverLP1
.87
.85
.02
.89
.85
.04
EverLP10
.72
.71
.01
.76
.71
.04
EverLP20
.65
.64
.01
.68
.65
.04
Hispanic
.41
.39
.02
.38
.40
-.01
Asian/Other
.15
.20
-.05
.22
.20
.02
Black
.27
.26
.01
.22
.26
-.04
White
.17
.15
-.02
.17
.14
.03
Non-English at Home
.43
.46
-.04
.48
.47
-.01
Female
.49
.50
-.01
.50
.50
.00
Ever FRPL
.89
.91
-.02
.91
.91
.00
SWD
.16
.13
.02
.13
.14
.00
Attendance Rate
84
85
-1.00
86
84
2.00
In UFM School
.44
.42
.02
.59
.43
.16
Students
Observations
Schools

20,278
57,938
90

313,848
831,675
770

132,367
464,033
882

345,871
942,756
858

Note: Descriptive statistics pooled across AY 2014-2018. Columns 1 and 4 present descriptive statistics
students in the stable school and full samples, respectively, that are ever exposed to a new menu. Columns
2 and 5 do so for students never exposed to a new menu. Differences in characteristics across the ever and
never new menu students in each sample are presented in columns 3 and 6.
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Table 3. Variation in Analytic Sample, AY 2014-2018
Analytic Samples
Full
Stable School
VARIABLES
(2)
(4)
New Menu
.33
.07
New School
.37
New Principal
.33
.28
Years Observed
3.24
2.88
Students
Observations
Schools

478,238
1,406,789
885

334,126
889,613
787

Note: Table shows percent of students across all years that experienced a menu, school, or principal
different than one they had the previous AY.
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Table 4. Distribution of Menus across Schools
AY
AY
Ay
AY
Menu Categories
2014
2015
2016
2017
Standard
226
535
612
691
Non-Standard
14
32
49
58
Express
5
8
15
23
Alternative
9
24
34
35
Food Court
0
0
0
0

AY
2018
672
64
20
34
10

School Adopt A New Menu
Adopt a Standard
Alternative
Express
Food Court

-

5
3
2
0
0

19
10
5
4
0

26
16
6
4
0

53
34
8
1
10

Switch from
Standard to Standard
Standard to Non-Standard
Non-Standard to Non-Standard
Non-Standard to Standard

-

3
2
0
0

9
9
0
1

15
10
0
1

28
18
1
6

240

567

661

749

736

Total Schools

Note: Values in cells represent the number of schools serving a specific menu type or adopting a new
menu in each academic year and are not cumulative.
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Table 5. Results for EverLP & LPrate
EverLP1
EverLP10
EverLP20
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: Overall Effect
Post New Menu
0.032**
0.042**
0.033
(0.013)
(0.017)
(0.020)

LPrate
(4)
2.45*
(1.42)

Panel B: Effect Over Time
Post New Menu 1st AY
0.027**
(0.014)
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY
0.067*
(0.037)

0.041**
(0.017)
0.049
(0.032)

0.034*
(0.020)
0.022
(0.031)

2.60*
(1.43)
1.27
(2.34)

Average EverLP
Observations
R-squared

.71
889,613
0.719

.64
889,613
0.708

39.8
889,613
0.77

.85
889,613
0.688

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as
school UFM status, new principal, and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 6. Results for EverLP & LPrate, UFM
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)

LPrate
(4)

UFM

0.088*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 4.476***
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.929)
Post New Menu*No UFM
0.015
0.030
0.009
0.572
(0.020)
(0.019)
(0.024)
(1.577)
Post New Menu*UFM
0.039** 0.047**
0.043*
3.264**
(0.017)
(0.020)
(0.022)
(1.608)
Average EverLP/LPrate
Observations
R-squared

.85
889,613
0.688

0.71
889,613
0.719

0.64
889,613
0.708

39.8
889,613
0.774

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as
school principal change and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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VARIABLES

Table 7. Results for New Non-Standard Menu
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20
(1)
(2)
(3)

Non-Standard Menu
Post New Menu*Standard Menu
Post New Menu*Non-Standard Menu

Average EverLP/LPrate
Observations
R-squared

LPrate
(4)

-0.004
(0.025)
0.009
(0.008)
0.062*
(0.033)

-0.005
(0.025)
0.024
(0.015)
0.067*
(0.037)

-0.011
(0.032)
0.014
(0.022)
0.062
(0.043)

-2.64
(3.03)
0.34
(1.83)
6.41*
(3.53)

.85
889,613
0.69

.71
889,613
0.72

.64
889,613
0.71

39.8
889,613
0.77

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as
school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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VARIABLES
Panel A: Overall Effect
Post New Menu

Table 8. Results for Other Outcomes
Attendance
Overweight
Underweight
Rate
or Obese
(1)
(2)
(3)

Panel B: Effect Over Time
Post New Menu 1st AY
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY

Observations
R-squared

zBMI

ln(BMI)

(4)

(5)
-0.005*
(0.002)

0.041
(0.373)

0.004
(0.004)

-0.010**
(0.004)

-0.026
(0.017)

0.118
(0.364)
-0.559
(0.708)

0.005
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)

-0.011**
(0.005)
-0.006
(0.007)

-0.029* -0.005**
(0.017) (0.002)
-0.001
0.000
(0.020) (0.004)

889,613
0.770

777,745
0.714

777,745
0.851

777,745 777,745
0.925
0.942

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as
school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. The sample for columns 2 through 5 are restricted
to students with weight data in years AY2014-2017. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Appendix
Table A1. Distribution of Schools with POS Systems by Academic Year

POS School
Non-POS School
Total

AY 2014
484
489
973

AY 2015 AY 2016
672
772
295
183
967
955

AY 2017
888
41
929

AY 2018
881
40
921

Note: Table shows the distribution of schools with and without POS systems across years among those
serving grades 6 through 12. A POS school is a school with a point-of-service system and a Non-POS
school is one without the system.

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for Schools with and Without POS Systems

Variable
Hispanic
Asian/Other
Black
White
Non-English at Home
Female
Ever FRPL
SWD
Attendance Rate
In UFM School
Grade 6
Grade 7
Grade 8
Grade 9
Grade 10
Grade 11
Grade 12
New School
New Principal

All Students
(1)
.40
.19
.26
.15
.47
.50
.91
.14
.83
.45
.13
.13
.14
.17
.16
.14
.13
.45
.37

By School POS Status
No
Yes
(2)
(3)
.44
.39
.14
.20
.30
.25
.13
.15
.43
.47
.51
.49
.93
.91
.15
.14
.84
.83
.33
.47
.18
.12
.19
.13
.19
.13
.12
.17
.12
.17
.10
.14
.10
.14
.50
.44
.38
.37

Analytic Samples
Full
Stable School
(4)
(5)
.39
.39
.21
.20
.25
.26
.15
.15
.47
.46
.50
.49
.91
.91
.14
.14
.85
.84
.49
.42
.10
.12
.15
.15
.14
.09
.17
.12
.17
.18
.15
.18
.11
.16
.37
.33
.28

Students
844,216
228,800
789,870
478,238
334,126
Student-Year
2,331,963
327,588
2,004,375
1,406,789
889,613
Schools
1,013
513
951
885
787
Note: Table presents descriptive statistics pooled across AY 2014 through AY 2018. Columns 1, 2 and 3
presents summary statistics for all NYC traditional public-school students in grades 6 through 12, those in
schools without POS systems, and those in school with POS systems, respectively. Columns 4 and 5
present descriptive statistics for the full and stable school analytic samples for reference. The full analytic
sample is smaller than the sample of all students in POS schools because of the requirement that students
be observed at least twice and attend schools serving a single menu.
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Table A3. Results for EverLP & LPrate, Full Sample
EverLP1
EverLP10 EverLP20
LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Overall Effect
Post Menu Change
0.020*
0.030**
0.025
2.50**
(0.010)
(0.013)
(0.016)
(1.25)
Panel B: Effect Over Time
Post New Menu 1st AY
0.020*
(0.011)
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY
0.018*
(0.011)
Average EverLP/LPrate
Observations
R-squared

.86
1,406,789
0.642

0.032**
(0.015)
0.023*
(0.012)

0.027
(0.017)
0.018
(0.015)

2.48*
(1.32)
2.57**
(1.19)

.73
.66
40.5
1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789
0.676
0.666
0.74

Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single
menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary
language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal
change, and enrollment. Panel A presents the estimates for the overall effect of a new menu adoption.
Panel B shows the estimates for the effect over time. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

Table A4. Results for EverLP & LPrate, Restricted Stable School Sample
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(5)
(6)
Panel A: Overall Effect
Post New Menu
0.013
0.024
0.016
2.18
(0.024)
(0.017)
(0.018)
(1.41)
Panel B: Effect Over Time
Post New Menu
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY

Average EverLP/LPrate
Observations
R-squared

0.019
(0.021)
0.046
(0.036)

0.020
(0.018)
0.006
(0.046)

0.008
(0.020)
-0.029
(0.051)

1.68
(1.57)
-0.58
(3.82)

.87
57,938
0.644

.72
57,938
0.701

.65
57,938
0.692

40.10
57,938
0.76

Note: Stable school sample restricted to students who ever experience a new menu. All models include
student, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education
services, as well as school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Panel A presents the estimates for
the overall effect of a new menu adoption. Panel B shows the estimates for the effect over time. Standard
errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

50

Table A5. Results for LPrate, Students with History of Lunch Participation
Sample
Stable School
Full
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Overall Effect
Post New Menu
2.60*
2.69**
(1.55)
(1.34)
Panel B: Effect Over Time
Post New Menu 1st AY
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY

Average LPrate
Observations
R-squared

2.75*
(1.56)
1.27
(2.48)

2.64*
(1.41)
2.91**
(1.30)

45.8
763,784
0.74

45.4
1,238,703
0.71

Note: Stable (full) school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who
do not (who do) change schools and attend schools serving a single menu with a history of lunch
participation (EverLP1 in period t-1). All models include student, grade, and year fixed effects, and
control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as school UFM
status, new principal and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A6. Results for EverLP & LPrate, School Fixed-Effects, Stable School Sample
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(5)
(6)
Panel A: Overall Effect
Post New Menu
0.029*
0.035*
0.023
1.52
(0.017)
(0.019)
(0.021)
(1.44)
Panel B: Effect Over Time
Post New Menu 1st AY
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY

Average EverLP/LPrate
Student-Year Obs.
R-squared

0.023
(0.017)
0.057
(0.037)

0.035*
(0.019)
0.034
(0.032)

0.026
(0.021)
0.009
(0.030)

1.99
(1.45)
-0.66
(2.00)

.85
888,837
0.220

0.71
888,837
0.246

0.64
888,837
0.245

39.8
888,837
0.29

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include school, grade, and year fixed
effects, and control for student race/ethnicity, gender, primary language at home, and special education
services, as well as school UFM status, new principal, and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and
clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

Table A7. Results for EverLP & LPrate, School Fixed-Effects, Full Sample
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(5)
(6)
Panel A: Overall Effect
Post New Menu
0.024
0.035
0.026
1.96
(0.018)
(0.021)
(0.023)
(1.67)
Panel B: Effect Over Time
Post New Menu
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY

Average EverLP/LPrate
Student-Year Obs.
R-squared

0.020
(0.020)
0.042
(0.030)

0.035
(0.023)
0.033
(0.030)

0.029
(0.025)
0.014
(0.030)

2.24
(1.71)
0.90
(2.24)

.87
.72
.66
40.57
1,404,624 1,404,624 1,404,624 1,404,624
0.206
0.231
0.228
0.28

Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single
menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary
language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal
change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A8. Results for EverLP & LPrate, Weight Controls, Stable School Sample
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(5)
(6)
Panel A: Overall Effect
Post New Menu
0.020*
0.037**
0.028
1.74
(0.012)
(0.017)
(0.021)
(1.46)
Panel B: Effect Over Time
Post New Menu 1st AY
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY

Average EverLP/LPrate
Observations
R-squared

0.015
(0.013)
0.060
(0.039)

0.035**
(0.017)
0.052*
(0.030)

0.029
(0.021)
0.022
(0.031)

1.89
(1.49)
0.45
(2.30)

.86
777,745
0.698

.72
777,745
0.728

.66
777,745
0.717

40.4
777,745
0.78

Note: Stable school sample restricted to students with weight and height data. All models include student,
grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home, special education services,
underweight, overweight, and obese, as well as school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Panel A
presents the estimates for the overall effect of a new menu adoption. Panel B shows the estimates for the
effect over time. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1).

Table A9. Results for EverLP & LPrate, Excluding Food Court Menu, Stable School
Sample
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post New Menu 0.028**
(0.014)
Observations
R-squared

0.026
(0.017)

877,985 877,985
0.689
0.720

0.011
(0.020)

1.01
(1.44)

877,985 877,985
0.708
0.77

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not
change schools, attend schools serving a single menu, and are not exposed to the food court menu. All
models include school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student race/ethnicity, gender,
primary language at home, and special education services, as well as school UFM status, new principal,
and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1).
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Table A10. Predicting New Menu Adoptions, School Level
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
Average LPrate
-0.001
-0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
% EverLP1
0.001
0.001
(0.001)
(0.003)
% EverLP10
-0.001
-0.000
(0.001)
(0.002)
% EverLP20
0.001
0.000
(0.001)
(0.002)
% Female
-0.002
-0.001
(0.002)
(0.003)
% Asian
-0.001
0.004
(0.004)
(0.005)
% Black
-0.001
0.001
(0.003)
(0.003)
% White
0.005
0.009
(0.005)
(0.008)
% Ever FRPL
-0.004
-0.011
(0.006)
(0.010)
% SWD
-0.003
-0.006**
(0.003)
(0.003)
% Non-English at Home
-0.002
0.000
(0.002)
(0.003)
School-Year Obs.
Schools
R-squared
F-Statistic

2,070
665
0.402
0.94

1,198
502
0.472
0.83

Note: Schools in the stable school sample. All models include school and year fixed-effects, the estimates
for which are typically small and statistically insignificant. Sample is further restricted to observations
with no new menu in period t for the analysis in column 2. The last observation of each school is dropped
for the analysis in column 1, and the first and last for that in column 2. The dependent variable in each
specification is an indicator variable for adopting a new menu in time t+1, and all left-hand side variables
are school characteristics in time t. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A11. Predicting New Menu Exposures, Student Level
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
LPrate
-0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
EverLP1
0.011
0.008
(0.008)
(0.012)
EverLP10
0.008
0.003
(0.005)
(0.007)
EverLP20
-0.002
0.005
(0.004)
(0.006)
SWD
-0.014**
-0.017
(0.006)
(0.013)
Non-English at Home
0.019
0.029
(0.015)
(0.042)
Observations
Students
R-Squared
F-Statistic

399,626
172,817
0.491
1.20

99,767
48,091
0.504
0.74

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who
do not change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. Sample is further restricted to
observations with no new menu in period t for the analysis in column 2. All models include
student, grade, and year fixed-effects. The last observation of each student is dropped for the
analysis in columns 1, and the first and last observations for that in column 2. The dependent
variable in each specification is an indicator variable for a menu change in time t+1, and all
right-hand side variables are time-varying student characteristics in time t. Standard errors in
parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A12. Falsification Test: Results for EverLP & LPrate, Stable School Sample
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Overall Effect
Early Post New Menu
0.028
0.029
0.010
-0.252
(0.018)
(0.025)
(0.027)
(1.977)
Panel B: Over Time
Early Post New Menu 1st AY
Early Post New Menu gt. 1 AY

Student-Year Obs.
R-squared

0.015
(0.017)
0.028**
(0.012)

0.010
(0.022)
0.040***
(0.014)

889,613
0.688

889,613
0.719

-0.007
(0.024)
0.035*
(0.018)
889,613
0.708

-1.679
(1.834)
2.910**
(1.299)
889,613
0.773

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students in schools
serving a single menu who do not change schools. All models include student, grade, and year fixed
effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as school
UFM status, principal change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
school level. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

Table A13. Falsification Test, Breakfast Participation, Stable School Sample
EverBP1 EverBP10 EverBP20 BPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(5)
(6)
Post New Menu

0.017
(0.025)

0.006
(0.023)

-0.005
(0.020)

0.17
(1.51)

Student-Year Obs.
R-squared

889,613
0.649

889,613
0.684

889,613
0.671

889,613
0.74

Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single
menu. All models include student, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language
at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal change,
and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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VARIABLES

Table A14. Results for EverLP & LPrate by Student Characteristics
Race/Ethnicity
Gender
FRPL Status
EverLP1 LPrate EverLP1 LPrate EverLP1 LPrate
(1)
(2)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Post New Menu*Asian/Other
Post New Menu*Hispanic
Post New Menu*Black
Post New Menu*White

0.018
0.514
(0.011) (1.681)
0.013
0.757
(0.011) (1.387)
0.032** 4.154**
(0.014) (2.056)
0.086** 5.251***
(0.034) (1.938)

Post New Menu*Male

0.021** 3.062**
(0.010) (1.519)
0.043** 1.799
(0.018) (1.456)

Post New Menu*Female
Post New Menu*Never FRPL

0.138*** 7.535***
(0.047) (1.697)
0.018*
1.777
(0.010) (1.446)

Post New Menu*Ever FRPL
Post New Menu*Grades 6-8

-0.011
0.795
(0.012) (1.844)
0.055*** 3.335*
(0.019) (1.926)

Post New Menu*Grades 9-12

Average EverLP/LPrate
Observations
R-squared

Grade
EverLP1 LPrate
(9)
(10)

.848
883,437
0.688

39.8
883,437
0.773

.848
39.8
.848
889,482 889,482 889,613
0.688
0.774
0.688

39.8
889,613
0.774

.848
39.8
889,613 889,613
0.688
0.774

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not change schools and attend schools serving a single menu.
All models include student, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as school UFM
status, principal change, and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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VARIABLES

Table A15. Results for EverLP & LPrate by Student Characteristics, Full Sample
Race/Ethnicity
Gender
FRPL Status
Grade
EverLP1
LPrate
EverLP1
LPrate
EverLP1
LPrate EverLP1 LPrate
(1)
(2)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Post New Menu*Asian/Other
Post New Menu*Hispanic
Post New Menu*Black
Post New Menu*White
Post New Menu*Male
Post New Menu*Female

0.028*** 3.216**
(0.010)
(1.298)
0.020**
2.104*
(0.010)
(1.191)
0.016
1.855
(0.010)
(1.412)
0.014
3.804***
(0.016)
(1.350)
0.029*** 4.362***
(0.010)
(1.294)
0.010
0.561
(0.011)
(1.247)

Post New Menu*Never FRPL

0.012
(0.020)
0.021**
(0.010)

Post New Menu*Ever FRPL
Post New Menu*Grades 6-8

-0.004
(0.009)
0.035**
(0.015)

Post New Menu*Grades 9-12

Student-Year Obs.
R-squared

4.247***
(1.294)
2.312*
(1.245)
2.148
(1.674)
2.720*
(1.638)

1,398,446 1,398,446 1,406,572 1,406,572 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789
0.642
0.736
0.642
0.736
0.642
0.736
0.642
0.736

Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single menu. All models include student, school,
grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school
UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A16. Results for EverLP & LPrate, UFM, Full Sample
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20
LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UFM

0.085***
(0.008)
Post New Menu*No UFM -0.003
(0.010)
Post New Menu*UFM
0.033***
(0.011)
Average EverLP/LPrate
Observations
R-squared

0.072***
(0.009)
0.009
(0.012)
0.042***
(0.014)

0.070***
(0.010)
0.007
(0.015)
0.035**
(0.017)

3.534***
(0.978)
1.791
(1.204)
2.900**
(1.321)

0.86
0.73
0.66
40.5
1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789
0.642
0.676
0.666
0.736

Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a
single menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student
primary language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM
status, principal change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

Table A17. Results for New Non-Standard Menu, Full Sample
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20
LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Non-Standard Menu
Post New Menu*Standard Menu
Post New Menu*Non-Standard Menu

Average EverLP/LPrate
Observations
R-squared

0.001
(0.023)
0.004
(0.006)
0.051*
(0.029)

-0.006
(0.021)
0.011
(0.011)
0.070**
(0.035)

0.003
(0.026)
0.013
(0.015)
0.049
(0.042)

-2.38
(3.07)
1.38
(1.20)
5.86
(3.57)

.86
.73
.66
40.5
1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789
0.642
0.676
0.666
0.74

Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single
menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary
language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal
change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A18. Results for EverLP and LPrate, Menu Type
EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
MS Standard
K-8 Standard
Alternative
Express
Food Court

Observations
R-squared

0.018
(0.012)
0.019
(0.014)
0.044
(0.027)
-0.016
(0.047)
0.057*
(0.030)

0.025
0.023
0.411
(0.017)
(0.018)
(1.491)
0.035
0.037
-0.174
(0.026)
(0.036)
(2.947)
0.015
0.003
0.210
(0.032)
(0.038)
(2.366)
-0.037
-0.061
-6.813
(0.045)
(0.045)
(4.600)
0.125*** 0.138*** 8.605***
(0.033)
(0.035)
(2.724)

889,613
0.688

889,613
0.719

889,613
0.708

889,613
0.773

Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students in schools
serving a single menu who do not change schools. All models include student, grade, and year fixed
effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as school
UFM status, principal change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

Table A19. Results for Other Outcomes, Full Sample
Attendance
Overweight
Underweight
zBMI Ln(BMI)
Rate
or Obese
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Panel A: Overall Effect
Post New Menu
0.555*
0.002
-0.005
-0.013
-0.002
(0.296)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.027) (0.004)
Panel B: Effect Over Time
Post New Menu 1st AY
0.643**
(0.287)
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY
0.187
(0.338)

0.003
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.005)

-0.006
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.005)

-0.017
(0.027)
0.004
(0.020)

Student-Year Obs.
R-squared

882,037
0.706

882,037
0.847

882,037 882,037
0.920
0.939

1,406,789
0.760

-0.003
(0.004)
0.000
(0.003)

Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single
menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary
language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal
change, and total enrollment. The sample for columns 2 through 5 are restricted to students with weight
data in years AY2014-2017. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Chapter 2
Incentivizing healthy eating in children: An investigation of the “ripple” and “temporal”
effects of a reward-based intervention
Introduction
According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), healthy eating promotes the optimal
growth and development of children while also reducing their risk for developing obesity and
other illnesses (CDC, 2015). The consumption of fruits and vegetables is of particular
importance, as they are not only key sources of fiber and essential micronutrients, but also help
to mitigate weight gain (Rolls et al., 2004; Ledikwe et al., 2006; Vioque et al., 2008). Most
American children ages two years and older do not, however, meet the United States Department
of Agriculture’s (USDA) recommendations for a diet rich in fruits and vegetables. In contrast,
their intake of sodium is more than the recommended maximum daily allowance and 40% of
their daily caloric intake comes from added sugars and solid fats, approximately half of which
are acquired through the consumption of various junk foods (CDC, 2015). Research also
suggests that diet during childhood is a significant predictor of diet in adulthood, and that
pediatric obesity has negative implications for adult health outcomes (Hingle, 2010; Nicklaus,
2009; Birch, 1999).
The latest figures available from the CDC indicate that, in the United States, 8.4% of 2to 5-year-olds, 17.7% of 6- to 11-year-olds, and 20.5% of 12- to 19-year-olds are obese, a
problem more acute among black, Hispanic, and low-income children (CDC, 2016). Given their
adverse effects on normal development, the associated costs, and influence on long-term eating
habits, the targeting of pediatric obesity and children’s unhealthy dietary choices are particularly
important. Preventative measures designed to induce better eating behaviors earlier in the
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lifecycle may therefore yield maximum health benefits and establish dietary habits that may
persist into adulthood.
A growing body of research examines the impacts of various interventions on
encouraging healthy eating habits in school-aged children. These range from various nonremunerative methods—used here to mean those in which participants are not provided a
tangible, material reward in return for the performance of a particular behavior—to remunerative
approaches—defined here as those in which participants receive some form of a tangible,
material reward in exchange for behaving in a desired manner. Although the former have been
studied extensively, the latter have generally been avoided due to concerns that their use may
“crowd out” intrinsic motivation for healthy eating behaviors and result in worse outcomes after
their removal (Horne et al., 2010), a phenomena sometimes also referred to as the
“overjustification effect” or the “negative rebound effect” (Just and Price, 2012). There exists,
however, scant evidence in favor of such an adverse effect in the context of fruit and vegetable
consumption (Horne et al., 2010), and the studies employing remunerative incentives find them
to have no impact on children’s intrinsic motivations (Raju et al., 2010; Corsini et al., 2011; Just
& Price 2013; Belot, James, & Nolen, 2013; Loewenstein, Price, and Volpp, 2016; List &
Samek, 2015a, 2015b).
Existing studies also suggest that remunerative interventions may be more cost-effective
than their non-remunerative counterparts, which tend to be costly, time-consuming, and laborintensive to put into practice (Hendy et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2012) while producing little, if
any, changes in dietary behaviors. Such interventions often involve changes to school curricula,
time-intensive involvement of everyone involved (e.g., teachers, staff, parents, or children),
costly materials (e.g., equipment or educational and informational materials), or the alteration of
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the physical aspects of school, home, or community environments (Cauwenberghe et al., 2010;
Evans et al., 2012; Hendrie et al., 2016). In contrast, remunerative interventions employing small
rewards worth 50 cents or less—even as low as a nickel (USD $0.05)—have been shown to
produce large changes in the choice and consumption of fruits and vegetables (Raju et al., 2010;
Just & Price 2013; Belot, James, & Nolen, 2013; Loewenstein, Price, and Volpp, 2016; List &
Samek, 2015a, 2015b). Simply affixing such small rewards to an item has also been shown to
increase their selection (List & Samek, 2015b), implying that such incentives may be effective at
little additional burden, financial or otherwise.
Given the promise of these initial studies, the impact of such rewards over time and their
influence on behaviors outside of experimental settings warrant further study. Regarding the
former, it may be that the effectiveness of rewards as a motivator in influencing dietary
behaviors diminishes over time as the novelty of their introduction wears off. If so, this may
imply that the frequency of their use, and the types of rewards used, may matter in designing a
long-term effective remunerative intervention. Studies that have attempted to investigate the
temporal dimensions of such interventions either suffer from significant data collection issues,
employ complex intervention schemes, or use designs that combine multiple treatments. Raju,
Rajagopal, and Gilbride (2010) find effects that fluctuated over the course of their study but
recommend a cautious interpretation of their findings as they failed to collect data on 62% of
their sample. The interventions tested in Belot, James, and Nolen (2013) consisted of a piece-rate
scheme and a competition scheme in which children had to collect a certain number of stickers to
be eligible for a prize at the end of each school week. While the piece rate scheme was found to
be ineffective, the competition scheme produced sizeable effects that diminished with time
overall but persisted for the subset of students who had some margin for improvement. Lastly,
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Loewesnstein, Price, and Volpp (2014) found effects that did not fade out over time but used
rewards in conjunction with a verbal prompt, making it difficult to attribute any effects to the
presence of rewards themselves.
As for the influence of rewards on behaviors in other contexts, no attempts have yet been
made to discern their impact outside of intervention settings. Health outcomes will ultimately
depend on whether any positive impacts on food choice within the intervention setting are off-set
or out-weighed by poor eating behaviors in other settings, behaviors that may be exacerbated by
the introduction of such incentives (Ransley et al., 2007; Evans et al., 2012; List and Samek,
2015). The introduction of rewards may have three potential effects. They may increase fruit
choice and consumption outside of the intervention setting if, for example, children, develop a
taste or habit for them. It may also be that such an intervention has no effect on dietary behaviors
outside of the setting in which it is administered. Lastly, the intervention may reduce the choice
and consumption of fruits if children compensate for foregoing junk food earlier in the day by
eating more of it in another setting. Of particular importance are behaviors at home where most
habits are learned (De Bourdeaudhuij, 1997; Campbell et al., 2007; Dowda et al., 2001), the
external setting of interest in this study.
This study seeks to add to the small body of literature on remunerative approaches
targeting children’s eating habits by shedding light on these issues in the context of fruit choice.
It employs a removed treatment within-subject design in conjunction with parent surveys and
presents the results of a month-long field experiment in which 23 low-income children ages 5 to
8 attending a summer program were offered a small prize for choosing a fruit cup for dessert
after lunch in lieu of cookies. The contributions are threefold. First, this study adds to the
contexts in which such experiments have been conducted and, in conjunction with previous
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studies, serves to bolster the case for the generalizability of existing findings. Second, by
surveying parents about their children’s dietary behaviors at home, this study attempts to identify
the potential impact of reward-based incentives on children’s eating behaviors outside of the
intervention setting—labeled here as “ripple” effects. Third, this study gauges the efficacy of
such interventions over time—labeled here as “temporal” effects—both between weeks and
within weeks.
Materials and Methods
Experimental Design
This study employs a removed treatment within-subjects design. In within-subjects
designs, participants serve as their own controls, thereby reducing the amount of error arising
from natural variance between individuals. Such designs are, however, susceptible to various
threats to internal validity. The plausibility of these threats is significantly diminished in the
context of a treatment removal design (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001). In such a design, pretreatment observations are first recorded, after which the treatment is introduced and posttreatment observations recorded. This is then followed by the removal of the treatment and
further observation. If it can be demonstrated that the outcome of interest rises and falls with the
presence or absence of the intervention, it becomes highly implausible that observed changes
could be the result of alternative factors or extraneous events, thereby facilitating causal
inferences.
Location
The field experiment was conducted at a Boys and Girls Club (BGC) location in central
New York, and was approved by Syracuse University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) as well
as the local branch of the BGC. The site serves low-income children ages 5 to 12 throughout the
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year with an after-school program when school is in session and an all-day program during the
summer months. During the summer, children are served breakfast and lunch, both of which are
provided by the local school district and are standard meals that are also served in school
cafeterias during the school year. These meals did not include dessert, which was introduced for
the first time as a part of this experiment.
School-like settings such as this serve as ideal testing grounds for interventions targeting
eating habits among children since schools—the likely hosts of any large-scale intervention—are
in a unique position to promote healthy eating as they offer opportunities for targeting large
numbers of children while also providing up to half of their daily caloric intake (USDA, 2017;
Briefel, Wilson, & Gleason, 2009). Additionally, summer programs may offer greater access to
children most likely to benefit from interventions targeting dietary choices to the extent that they
serve those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.
Participants
Parents with children ages 5 to 8 were asked in person if they wished to participate in the
study, and allow for their children to participate, as they arrived to pick up their children from
the program. Mothers were targeted as research indicates that they are the most accurate source
of information about the behavior patterns of their children (Hendy et al. 2005)—an important
consideration since parent surveys are an integral component of this study. The age range was
selected to fit the theme of early dietary interventions as well as to facilitate the investigation of
“ripple effects” using parent surveys, which requires that children be old enough to express their
preferences but still young enough to need their parents help in obtaining access to food.
Of eligible parents who personally picked up their child from the site and indicated that
they intended to enroll, or had enrolled, them in the summer program, 25 were solicited and only
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one refused to participate. Of those who initially agreed to participate, 19 ultimately had their
children attend the summer program. Upon consenting, assent was also obtained from their
children, on whom socioeconomic and demographic information was collected. As summarized
in Table 9, participants were predominantly Black and most children were part of low-income,
single-parent households.
In sum, 29 children and their parents were recruited for the study, of which 23 were present
on at least one day during the field experiment. This sample comprises approximately 61% of all
children ages 5 to 8 that were enrolled in the summer program, but likely more on any given day
since some children attended sporadically.
Timeline & Procedure
On-site enrollment for the experiment began in mid-June of 2016. The recruitment period
lasted three weeks, two of which occurred while school was still in session. The third week of
recruitment took place during the first week of the site’s summer program. The four-week field
experiment commenced immediately after the recruitment period. The first week was composed
of pre-intervention baseline observations, the intervention was implemented the following two
weeks, and the final week consisted of post-intervention removal observations.
During the first week of the experiment, children were told that they could choose
between a fruit cup or a cookie cup for dessert. During the following intervention period,
children were told that they could again choose between a fruit cup and a cookie cup for dessert,
but that they would receive a prize for choosing the former and nothing for choosing the latter.
The final post-intervention week mimicked the first week of the experiment. Children also had
the option of choosing neither dessert in each period.
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After lunch, a tray of desserts was set out lined with white napkins displaying 24
translucent plastic cups containing fruits on the left-hand side and 24 identical cups containing
cookies on the right-hand side. Given that the site served between 45 and 60 children on any
given day, additional fruit and cookie cups were prepared and set to the side in order to replenish
the supply on the tray if necessary. The site director or, in some instances, another staff member
would first ask all 5 to 8-year olds to line up by the food counter. As they approached the dessert
tray, they were provided the appropriate information for that particular week and asked to make a
choice. Once all 5 to 8-year olds had been served, the site director or staff member would ask the
9 to 12-year-old children to line up by the food counter, after which the process was repeated.
After the 9 to 12-year olds had been served, the 5 to 8 year olds were once again asked to line up
by the counter so that the consumption of participating children could be recorded. All of the
children were instructed not to throw away their cups until their consumption was recorded. The
cups of participating children were examined to see how much they had eaten, and consumption
was recorded as either a quarter, half, three quarters, all of a cup, or none.
Prizes
Prizes included small notepads, pencils, pencil sharpeners, rubber balls, rings, airplanes,
and finger lights, each worth on average roughly 10 cents. These prizes were chosen since the
reward value of similar items were established in List & Samek (2015). Prizes also varied in
color and design in order to ensure that children would continue to value them throughout the
experiment, as per List and Samek (2015). Children choosing a fruit cup during the intervention
period were allowed to choose one prize from among the options listed, which were set on the
countertop next to the dessert tray within sight.

72

Parent Pre-Survey and Post-Surveys and Daily Logs
A novel component of this study is its attempt to provide insights on the ripple effects of
remunerative interventions—that is to say, in this context, the effect of rewards introduced in the
experimental setting on children’s eating behaviors at home. To do so, this study employs both
pre- and post-intervention surveys and daily logs, to be completed by participating parents. The
purpose of incorporating both surveys and the daily logs is twofold. First, including both allows
for the pre- and post-survey responses to not only be compared with one another to identify any
differences in a child’s eating behavior, but also to be compared with the results from the daily
logs to corroborate their veracity. If, for example, the trend in the daily logs and survey
responses are positively correlated, confidence in the accuracy of the responses is enhanced.
Second, in the event that one of the methods produces unusable responses, perhaps due to
respondent related issues, the other may be used as a substitute. In both cases, parents were
motivated to complete the surveys and daily logs with a cash incentive.34
Parents were asked to complete the first survey upon enrollment prior to the
implementation of the experiment in order to establish a baseline and the second a week after its
conclusion. To reduce the burden on parents and minimize respondent fatigue, the surveys were
comprised of six questions adapted from the Child Eating Behavior Inventory.35 Similarly,
parents were also asked to maintain a daily log—including weekends—of their child’s behavior
and preferences regarding fruits for the duration of the experiment. To minimize burden and

34

Parents could earn up to $25 per child. Parents were given $3 for completing the first survey, $5 per completed
daily log, and $2 for the final survey.
35
The Child Eating Behavior Inventory comprises 40 items that are rated on a 5-point scale with response options
being “never,” “seldom,” “sometimes,” “often,” and “always.” It is a parent-report instrument designed to assess
childhood eating and mealtime problems. Six of the 40 questions were selected and modified to fit the context in
which they were used. The questions used for this study, and how they were adapted, are available in Figure A1 of
the Appendix.
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respondent fatigue for the daily logs, parents were asked to answer six short “yes or no”
questions each night of the week.
Desserts
The healthy dessert in this experiment consisted of a fruit cup, while the unhealthy
dessert consisted of a cookie cup. Fruits are nutrient-dense and are therefore recommended by
the USDA for their health benefits. In fact, the USDA recommends that individuals increase their
fruit consumption as part of a healthy eating pattern (USDHHS & USDA, 2015). In contrast,
cookies provide little nutrients and are high in sugar content. Fruit cups weighed approximately
85 grams, 5 grams more than the minimum serving size recommended by any governmental
agency in the OECD (Evans et al., 2012).36 In an effort to ensure equal familiarity with both
desserts, fruits and cookies were chosen such that they would be universally recognizable.
Apples, pears, grapes, and bananas were served as the fruit options and chocolate chip and Oreo
cookies were served as the cookie options. Combinations of fruits served varied by type and
color, as did cookies, in order to mitigate the risk of children losing interest in the food items.37
Data Analysis
The analysis employs standard experimental methods, supplemented by econometric
analysis. Changes in children’s dessert choice between weeks are first analyzed using two-tailed
paired sample t-tests. The longitudinal nature of the data collection produced 358 participant-day
observations, thereby also facilitating the use of regression analysis. The comparison of means
tests in the proportion of fruit cups chosen by participating children are therefore supplemented

36

USDA recommendations differ by type of fruit and how it is served. Consequently, no one standard applies to an
assortment of fruits. Therefore, the minimum OECD requirement, in grams, was used for each serving.
37
Additional information on dessert combinations and dessert cup composition are provided in Figure A2 of the
Appendix.
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by logistic regressions with dessert choice as the dependent variable—where dessert choice
equals 1 if a child chose a fruit cup and 0 if they chose a cookie cup or neither—and a treatment
dummy as the independent variable of interest, conditional on attendance. The results of a linear
probability model (LPM) are also presented to facilitate the reporting and interpretation of
marginal effects. All regressions include individual fixed effects to account for any timeinvariant participant-specific characteristics and standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Results
Attendance, Consumption, & Prize Selection
Ideally, participating children would have been observed on each of the 20 weekdays of
the study. Attendance for some children was, however, sporadic. As a result, roughly 78% of the
potential 460 child-day observations were those for which the children were present on site. In
sum, participating children made a total of 358 decisions during the four weeks of the
experiment, of which 50.84% resulted in the choice of a fruit cup and 46.65% that of a cookie
cup. Neither dessert option was chosen in only nine out of the 358 instances, constituting 2.33%
of total decisions. Among those who chose a dessert, consumption was near universal, with the
contents of fruit and cookie cups being consumed in their entirety 95% of the time, as shown in
Table 10. Cheating was not observed by myself or by any members of the staff. Also depicted is
prize selection. Descriptive statistics suggest that non-school related prizes were the most
desirable, particularly the finger-lights and the rubber balls, which constituted approximately
44% and 34% of all prize selections, respectively.38
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Prize selection was calculated by taking the total number of rewards ordered prior to the beginning of the study
and subtracting from that what remained after its conclusion. IRB, however, required that prizes and desserts be
made available to all children present on site, regardless of their participation status. Since all children present were
afforded an opportunity to choose a prize, the proportions are only close approximations of the selections made by
participating children.
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Baseline, Treatment, and Post-Treatment Week Comparisons on Selection
The change in dessert choice among participants who chose a dessert, averaged across
days for each week, is depicted in Figure 8. There were large changes between Week 1 and the
intervention weeks, and between the intervention weeks and week 4. The statistical significance
of these differences is assessed using paired sample t-tests. The proportion of children choosing
fruit cups increased from 32% in Week 1 to 81% in Week 2 (p < .001), decreased from 81% to
64% between Weeks 2 and 3 (p = .023), and fell further from 64% to 29% between Weeks 3 and
4 (p = .003). A comparison of children’s pre- and post-intervention choices also showed no
change, as indicated by the statistical insignificance of the difference in the proportion choosing
fruits between Weeks 1 and 4, which were 32% and 29% respectively (p = .33).

The results from the fixed-effect logistic and linear probability model regressions, which
corroborate these results, are depicted in Table 11. Models 1 and 3 are fixed-effect logistic
models whereas Models 2 and 4 are linear probability models. To identify the effect of the
reward-based incentives in inducing the choice of fruit cups over that of cookie cups, the sample
is restricted to observations collected in Weeks 1, 2, and 3 for models 1 and 2, and the treatment
dummy is a binary variable that takes the value of 0 if the intervention was absent and 1 if
present. To ascertain the effect of their removal, the sample used for models 3 and 4 is restricted
to observations collected in Weeks 2, 3, and 4, and the treatment dummy takes the value of 1 if
the intervention is absent and 0 if present. The coefficients on the variables of interest are
statistically significant in each specification. The linear probability models show that the effects
of the intervention are large in magnitude, with its introduction increasing the likelihood of a
child choosing a fruit cup by 37 percentage-points and its removal reducing that likelihood by 43
percentage-points.
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Separating the treatment effect by week also highlights the waning effect of the
incentives over time. As shown in Table 12, the introduction of incentives increased the
likelihood of a fruit cup being chosen by 45 percentage-points in the first week of the
intervention (Week 2). By the second week (Week 3), this effect dropped to 28 percentagepoints. Further analysis also indicates that the effect of the incentives wane not only between
intervention weeks but within intervention weeks as well, as depicted in Figure 9. The effect of
the incentives are strongest during the first half of the first intervention week (Week 2: Monday,
Tuesday, and Wednesday), in which they increase the likelihood of choosing a fruit cup by 49
percentage-points. The effect then declines steadily to 26 percentage-points by the second half of
the second intervention week (Week 3: Thursday and Friday). In both the between-week and
within-week cases, the null hypothesis of equality between the aforementioned coefficients was
rejected (p = .017 and p = .051, respectively).39
Robustness Checks
If children’s absence was in some way related to their propensity to choose fruits or
cookies, the sporadic attendance of some children may be a concern. However unlikely this
might be, the sensitivity of the results to attendance were checked by restricting the sample to
only those students who were present at least one day during each of the given periods of interest
(i.e. the sample was restricted so that each child contributes to the analysis in each period). For
the overall and between week effects, participating children must have attended at least once
during each week to be included in the analysis. For the within-week effects, each child must
have attended at least once during each week half to be included in the analysis. Accounting for

39

The null hypotheses of equality between all of the coefficients shown in Table 12 were tested and the p-values are
shown in Table A20 of the Appendix.
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attendance and re-conducting the analysis did not change the result, which remained almost
identical to the original estimates. These results are presented in Table A21 of the Appendix.
Alternatively, it may be that the results of the within-week analysis may be sensitive to
how the days are grouped. To investigate this possibility, the first half of each week was
redefined to comprise of Monday and Tuesday, while the second half was redefined to include
Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Doing so did not change the coefficient estimates, which
again remained nearly identical to the original estimates, but led to an increase in the statistical
significance of the difference between coefficients. These results are presented in Table A22 and
Table A23 of the Appendix, respectively. Finally, three of the participating children had parents
that were employed on site. Dropping these children and conducting the same analysis did not
change the results. These results are depicted in Table A24 of the Appendix.
Effect of Intervention on Children’s Preferences at Home
Survey responses did not produce evidence of either a positive or negative “ripple” effect.
Both pre-intervention and post-intervention Child Eating Behavior surveys were obtained for 16
of the 23 children, constituting a response rate of approximately 70%. Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients for the pre-intervention and post-intervention surveys were .84 and .89, respectively.
To get a sense of how parents perceptions may have changed overall, the survey scores across
individuals for each period were aggregated (i.e. the sum of the total survey score for each child;
minimum score possible = 5, maximum score possible = 30). The post-intervention aggregate
score of 389 declined relative to the pre-intervention aggregate score of 422. This could suggest
that—as a whole—parents felt worse about their children’s eating behaviors with regards to
fruits. However, a two-tailed paired sample t-test indicates that the null hypothesis of no
difference between pre- and post-survey responses cannot be rejected (p = .13). Consequently,
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there is no statistical evidence that children’s eating behaviors outside of the experimental setting
were affected due to the intervention.
While the response rate to the surveys did allow for some inference, that for the daily
logs was not sufficiently large for any meaningful analysis or comparison with the survey results.
Although they did not contradict the survey findings, daily logs for each week were obtained for
only seven of the children—constituting a 30% response rate. This was, however, a contingency
that was planned for by having both pre- and post-surveys and daily logs. Although the results of
the survey response analysis cannot be fully corroborated by a secondary measure, they
nonetheless do offer some insight on preferences outside of the experimental setting.
Internal Validity
Treatment Effects
In the absence of randomized assignment into treatment and control groups, potential
threats to internal validity in this context include “history,” “maturation,” and “experimenter”
effects. The research design employed reduces the plausibility of these threats, however. History
effects may be present if factors external to the experiment occurred concurrent to the
intervention being introduced and removed that could also have affected fruit cup choice in the
directions observed. There is no indication this was the case, however, since there were no
changes in the site’s operations or in the school districts provision of meals during this time.
Since participating children were eight years old and younger, any confounding extraneous
factors would have had to occur at home, but there is nothing to suggest that anything changed
significantly over the course of the four-week experiment.
Given the length of the study and the ages of the participants involved, it is also unlikely
that any observed effects could be attributed to the maturation of the participants. Furthermore,
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that fruit cup choice increased with the introduction of the rewards and declined back to preintervention levels after their removal suggests that no such maturation occurred. Experimenter
effects may have biased the fruit cup selection and consumption upward if the presence of the
researcher motivated the children to do so at higher rates than they otherwise would. To the
extent possible, such an effect was mitigated with the inclusion of a baseline observation week,
which would have accounted for any upward bias, and by restricting interactions with the
subjects to the bare minimum necessary to execute the study.
In addition to these potential confounders, there may exists a threat unique to the
removed treatment within-subjects design that must be addressed. It may be that the decline in
fruit cup choice may not be due to the removal of rewards but rather the result of a declining
time trend in the desire to choose fruit cups. This study does, in fact, suggest that there may exist
such a trend. To test whether the decline between the second half of Week 3 and the first half of
Week 4, as seen in Figure 9, is a consequence of treatment removal, the sample was restricted to
corresponding observations and a linear probability model regression was used. Dessert choice
was regressed on a dummy variable representing the first half of Week 4 (Monday, Tuesday, and
Wednesday), with a dummy representing the second half of Week 3 (Thursday and Friday) as the
comparison. The analysis finds a 25-percentage point drop in the probability of choosing fruit
cups associated with the removal of rewards (p = .08). The sharp decline in fruit cup choice
between the second half of Week 3 and the first half of Week 4—from 61% to 35%—in
conjunction with the overall sharp drop between Weeks 3 and 4—from 64% to 29%—implies
that, though declining, the trend itself could not be the cause at the time the intervention was
removed.
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Finally, like all such studies, randomized or not, “peer effects” are unavoidable. Peer
effects may be present if, for example, the introduction of rewards induced popular children to
choose fruits, which in turn influenced the decision of their peers to do so as well. However, to
the extent that peer effects bias the results upwards, they can be thought of as a desirable source
of bias if they serve to increase fruit cup selection and consumption, which is the desired
objective. Insofar as their presence has biased the results of this study downward, the magnitude
of the intervention effect implies that such an impact is not large enough to nullify the estimated
effects.
Survey Results
It is possible that parents were not entirely blind to the intervention and that their
responses to the surveys may have been affected as a result. Of particular concern would be
“social desirability” bias, whereby parents may have answered questions pertaining to their
children’s preferences for fruits so as to be viewed more favorably. The decline in aggregate
scores between the pre-survey and post-survey suggests that this may not be the case, but it may
also be that the introduction of the first survey made parents more conscious of their children’s
dietary behaviors such that their responses in the second survey were more indicative of their
true preferences.
To minimize such risks, parents were only provided the minimum amount of information
about the experiment as required by IRB. They were informed that their children would be
served desserts and would also have the opportunity to win prizes, but nothing was said about the
motivation for the experiment, its objectives, or how it was to be implemented. While it is
certainly possible that parents may have been aware of the aims of the study to some extent, and
that survey responses reflected that knowledge, ethical and moral concerns would not allow the
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nature of the experiment to be completely hidden from potential participants. However, this issue
affects any study involving human participants and which requires their explicit consent.
Discussion
The introduction of small reward-based incentives increased the proportion of children
choosing a fruit cup in lieu of a cookie cup for dessert after lunch, thereby corroborating the
findings of existing studies. Also as in previous studies, no evidence was found to suggest that
the introduction of rewards crowded out children’s intrinsic motivation. Consumption was also
high, with nearly all children consuming the contents of their chosen dessert cup in its entirety.
Though the presence of small rewards in general appeared to excite and motivate the children,
non-school related rewards appeared to be the most popular among the options available for
those that chose a fruit cup. Further analysis also suggests that the effect of reward-based
incentives wane over time, not only between weeks but also within weeks. The effect of the
incentives on the likelihood of choosing a fruit cup declined by 37% between Weeks 2 and 3—
the first and last of the intervention weeks. Similarly, between the first half of Week 2 and the
second half of Week 3, the effect of the incentives declined by nearly half.
Together, all of the above-mentioned findings suggest that—at least in this context—
small reward-based incentives are effective for low-income children, though their effect
diminishes over time and depends on the types of rewards offered. Future investigations of
reward-based interventions administered daily are encouraged to provide more insight on the
former. If the findings here are corroborated, it may suggest that any reward-based intervention
should be administered intermittently to maintain its effect over time. The latter suggests that
rewards that excite students should be chosen for maximum effect and that there should be
variation in the types of rewards available so as to maintain children’s interest in them. To the
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extent that the negative trend observed in the intervention effect is a byproduct of children losing
interest in the incentives being offered, then the introduction of new prizes at optimal intervals
may have an offsetting effect, thereby potentially facilitating the continuous provision of
rewards. Future research is therefore also needed to ascertain the types of prizes likely to elicit
the greatest response and the requisite variation necessary to maintain interest.
As for the evidence pertaining to “ripple” effects, the findings presented here are likely
not definitive. Although the survey results suggest that there may be no external effects related to
the introduction of reward-based incentives in school or school-like settings, the response rate
and the lack of a second measure to corroborate the accuracy of the responses leave much to be
desired. Further research is therefore necessary to assess the effect of rewards-based incentives
outside of intervention-settings.
With that said, the presence of negative “ripple” effects may be less of a concern among
children from low-income families, as studies suggest that such children consume fewer fruits
and vegetables at home (Krebs-Smith et al. 1996; Munoz et al. 1997). Anecdotal evidence
collected as part of conversations with various staff members and non-staff familiar with the
community that the site served also suggest that the children in this study—nearly all of whom
were from low-income households—did not consume many fruits and vegetables at home, if any
healthy food at all.
Finally, given this study’s sample selection process and size, the generalizability of the
results presented here are limited. Nevertheless, by adding yet another context in which
remunerative interventions have been tested, the results of this study together with those of
others bolsters the case for their efficacy among young children and provides suggestive
evidence for the absence of any adverse “ripple” effects. Furthermore, the study population is
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one of particular interest since low-income children are likely to benefit the most from
interventions targeting their dietary behaviors.
Conclusions
Corroborating existing studies, the introduction of small reward-based incentives were
found to increase the number of children choosing the healthy dessert options after lunch but
disaggregating the results by week and days suggests that their impact may diminish over time.
Attempts to ascertain their effect outside of experimental settings did not indicate that the
introduction of rewards had any adverse effects, but also did not provide definitive results.
Consequently, further research is needed in this regard. There is also a greater need for long-term
studies, not only to assess the temporal effects of reward-based interventions but also habit
formation. If children were to develop a habit for healthier eating behaviors within intervention
settings, this may then translate to better dietary choices in other environments as well.
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Tables & Figures
Figure 8. Proportion Choosing Fruits – Between Weeks
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Note: This table depicts the change in dessert choice among participants who chose a dessert, averaged
across days for each week.
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Figure 9. Proportion Choosing Fruits – Within Weeks
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Note: This graph depicts within-week changes in the proportion of participants choosing fruits. The first
half of each week denotes Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, and the second half denotes Thursday and
Friday.
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics
Characteristics

Frequency

Percent of Total

AGE
5
6
7
8

5
3
10
5

22%
13%
43%
22%

Gender
Female
Male

9
14

39%
61%

Race
Black
White
Mixed (Black & White)
Other

17
1
2
3

74%
9%
13%
4%

Ethnicity
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic

2
21

9%
91%

Household Type
Single Mother
Both Parents
Alternate Custody

15
7
1

65%
30%
4%

Household Income
<10,000
10,001 – 20,000
20,001 – 30,000
40,001 – 50,000

11
8
1
3

48%
35%
4%
13%

Number of Siblings
0
1
2
3
4

6
9
2
3
3

26%
39%
9%
13%
13%

Free Lunch

23

100%

Note: This table provides socioeconomic and demographic information for participating children. The
percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.
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Table 10. Consumption and Prize Selection
¼ Cup
Amount
Consumed
Proportion

Proportion

½ Cup

Consumption (Weeks 1 – 4)
¾ Cup

All

Total

2

2

12

332

348†

0.57%

0.57%

3.45%

95.40%

100%

Pencil
Sharpeners

Pamphlets

Prize Selection (Weeks 2 & 3)
Pencils
Rings
Gliders

3.42%

2.48%

2.48%

3.12%

11.49%

Rubber
Balls

Finger
Lights

Total

33.54%

43.48%

100%‡

Note: The top panel depicts consumption of fruits and cookies throughout the experiment and the bottom
panel depicts prize selection in weeks 2 and 3. The total number of prizes ordered were as follows: 72
pencil sharpeners,72 pamphlets, 144 plastic rings, 100 pencils, 72 gliders, 144 rubber balls, and 140
finger lights. † Of 358 decisions, 349 resulted in the choice of a dessert. However, total consumption
observations sum to 348 as one child dropped their fruit cup and did not ask for it to be replenished. This
child had dropped the contents of their chosen dessert cups several times during the duration of the
experiment but had asked for it to be replenished each time, with this time being the sole exception. ‡
Refer to footnote 5 for details.
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Table 11. Intervention and Post-Intervention Effects
Treatment Effect
(1)
(2)
Logit Model
LPM
Intervention

2.090***
(0.410)
[1.287, 2.894]

0.372***
(0.0732)
[.229, .516]
-2.507***
(0.471)
[-3.429, -1.585]

Post-Intervention

Constant

Removal of Treatment Effect
(3)
(4)
Logit Model
LPM

-0.196***
(0.0549)
[-.303, -.088]

-0.429***
(0.0768)
[-.579, -.279]
0.209***
(0.0236)
[.163, .255]

Observations
257
275
264
266
Note: Models (1) & (3) are logistic models with fixed-effects and clustered standard errors (both at the
individual level); Models (2) & (4) are linear probability models with fixed-effects and clustered standard
errors (both at the individual level). Standard errors in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals in brackets; * p
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 12. Week and Day Intervention Effects
Week 1 (Omitted)
Week 2

Week 3

(1)
LPM Week Effects
0.451***
(0.0734)
[.307, .595]

(2)
LPM Day Effects

0.283**
(0.0885)
[.109, .457]

Week 2 – first half

0.494***
(0.0860)
[.325, .662]

Week 2 – second half

0.387***
(0.0845)
[.222, .553]

Week 3 – first half

0.296**
(0.0920)
[.115, .476]

Week 3 – second half

0.264*
(0.114)
[.039, .488]

Constant

-0.199***
(0.0544)
[-.305, -.092]

-0.198***
(0.0545)
[-.305, -.091]

Observations
275
275
Note: Model’s (1) & (2) are linear probability models with fixed-effects and clustered standard errors
(both at the individual level). The baseline week is omitted in model (1) and, similarly, the baseline days
are omitted in model (2). Standard errors in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals in brackets; * p < 0.05,
** p <0.01, ***p<0.001.
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Appendix
Figure A1. Survey Questions

These questions were adapted form the Child Eating Behavior Inventory (CEBI), a parent-report instrument
designed to assess childhood eating and mealtime problems. These questions were adapted in the following
way:

1. Question 7 of CEBI: “My child enjoys eating”
a. Adapted to read: “My child enjoys eating fruits”
2. Question 8 of CEBI: “My child asks for food which he/she shouldn’t have”
Question 25 of CEBI: “My child asks for food between meals”
a. Adapted to read: “My child asks for fruits”
3. Question 9 of CEBI: “My child feeds him/her self as expected for his/her age”
a. Adapted to read: “My child feeds him/her-self fruits”
4. Question 11 of CEBI: “I feel confident my child eats enough”
a. Adapted to read: “I feel confident my child eats enough fruits”
5. Question 25 of CEBI: “My child asks for food between meals”
a. Adapted to read: “My child asks for fruits between meals”
6. Question 17 of CEBI: “My child eats quickly”
Question 27 of CEBI: “My child eats chunky food”
a. Adapted to read: “My child eats fruits”
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Figure A2. Dessert Combinations
(1)
Week 1†
Mon. (7/11)
Tues. (7/12)
Wed. (7/13)
Thurs. (7/14)
Fri. (7/15)
Week 2*
Mon. (7/18)
Tues. (7/19)
Wed. (7/20)
Thurs. (7/21)
Fri. (7/22)
Week 3*
Mon. (7/25)
Tues. (7/26)
Wed. (7/27)
Thurs. (7/28)
Fri. (7/29)
Week 4‡
Mon. (8/1)
Tues. (8/2)
Wed. (8/3)
Thurs. (8/4)
Fri. (8/5)

(2)

Dessert Combination
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)

(8)

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: Dessert combinations are as follows: (1) Apples, bananas, purple grapes, and chocolate chip
cookies; (2) Apples, bananas, green grapes, and chocolate chip cookies; (3) Pears, bananas, purple grapes,
and chocolate chip cookies; (4) Apples, bananas, green grapes and Oreo cookies; (5) Apples, bananas,
purple grapes, and Oreo cookies; (6) Pears, green grapes, purple grapes, and chocolate chip cookies; (7)
Pears, purple grapes, bananas, and Oreo cookies; (8) Pears, green grapes, bananas, and chocolate chip
cookies.
† Baseline week
* Intervention Week
‡ Post-intervention week
Additional Information: Each fruit cup contained roughly four diced pieces of an apple or pear, five
grapes, and four pieces of banana, in that order (~85 grams). Each cookie cup consisted of one and a half
cookies (if chocolate chip) or two cookies (if Oreos). That the fruit cups may appear more full than the
cookie cups may be a potential source of bias. Some children may have, for example, preferred the cookie
cups for dessert simply because they are satiated and do not wish to eat a lot for dessert. This would be a
source of downward bias for the effect of the intervention. On the other hand, children may wish to
choose the cup they believe offers the most food. If so, then this would bias the results upwards. It’s hard
to imagine that this is the case though, as children are unlikely to do such cost-benefit analysis and, after
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just having eaten lunch, it’s unlikely that they are still so hungry that they would choose fruit cups simply
because they contain more food. In fact, children were sometimes able to get a second serving of lunch if
they so desired, and some did. The inclusion of a baseline observation week in the analysis should,
however, account for such effects.
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Table A20. Comparison of Coefficients
Week 2
Week 1
Week 2
1st half
2nd half
Week 3
1st half
2nd half

Week 2
1st half
2nd half

Week 3
1st half
2nd half

.017

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶
̶

̶

0.231
̶

0.035
0.107

0.051
0.282

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶

0.749
̶

Note: These p-values correspond to tests of equality between the coefficients in Table 4. t-tests were used
to compare differences in coefficients for statistical significance and the p-values are reported. The first
half of each week is comprised of Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. The second half is comprised of
Thursday and Friday.
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Table A21. Robustness Check: Attendance
(1)
Intervention
Introduction
Intervention

(2)
Intervention
Removal

(3)
Week
Effects

(4)
Day
Effects

0.365***
(0.0746)
-0.429***
(0.0768)

Post-Intervention

Week 2

0.454***
(0.0762)

Week 3

0.275**
(0.0895)

1st half of Week 2

0.476***
(0.0881)

2nd half of Week 2

0.373***
(0.0911)

1st half of Week 3

0.282**
(0.0985)

2nd half of Week 3

0.254*
(0.116)

-0.190***
0.209***
-0.198***
-0.187**
(0.0560)
(0.0236)
(0.0559) (0.0579)
Observations
267
263
264
252
Note: Columns 1 through 4 present the results from linear probability models with fixed-effects and
clustered standard errors (both at the individual level). The sample is restricted so that each individual
attends at least once in any given period of interest and therefore contributes to the analysis. Coefficients
denote treatment effects. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Constant
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Table A22. Robustness Check: Alternative Days
(1)
Day Effects
Week 2 – first half

0.500***
(0.0955)

Week 2 – second half

0.416***
(0.0767)

Week 3 – first half

0.389***
(0.0972)

Week 3 – first half

0.210*
(0.0973)

Constant

-0.189***
(0.0542)

Observations
275
Note: These are the results from a linear probability model with fixed-effects and clustered standard errors
(both at the individual level). The baseline days are omitted. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, **
p <0.01,***p<0.001.

Table A23. Comparison of Coefficients
Week 2
Week 2
1st half
2nd half
Week 3
1st half
2nd half

Week 2
1st half
2nd half

Week 3
1st half
2nd half

̶

̶
̶

̶

0.321
̶

0.311
0.691

0.006
0.017

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶

̶

0.043
̶

Note: These p-values correspond to tests of equality between the coefficients in Table A3. t-tests were
used to compare differences in coefficients for statistical significance and the p-values are reported. The
first half of each week is comprised of Monday and Tuesday. The second half is comprised of
Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.
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Table A24. Robustness Check: Excluding Children with Parents on Site
Treatment Effect
Removal of Treatment
Effect
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Intervention

2.343***
(0.430)

0.386***
(0.0765)

Post-Intervention

Constant
Observations

214

-0.206***
(0.0573)
232

-2.763***
(0.587)

-0.437***
(0.0895)

223

0.211***
(0.0275)
225

Note: Model’s (1) & (3) are conditional logit with fixed-effects and clustered standard errors (both at the
individual level); Model’s (2) & (4) are linear probability models with fixed-effects and clustered
standard errors (both at the individual level). Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <
0.001
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Chapter 3
Think of the Children? The Effect of Children on Public Support for the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program
Introduction
Public opinion of government programs is often group-centric in that it is shaped by
attitudes towards the social or demographic groups perceived to be their beneficiaries (Nelson &
Kinder, 1996; Converse, 2006; Winter, 2008). This is particularly true for welfare programs,
which are highly politicized and racialized and often the target of reforms that limit their scope
and coverage. Motivating these reforms are perceptions of benefits recipients as undeserving of
aid—predicated on the idea that many are able to work but choose not to—and (or) the
association of welfare with black Americans (e.g., Gamson & Lasch, 1983; Gilens, 1999). The
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the largest food assistance program in the
United States, is no exception (Goren, 2008).
Growth in caseloads and costs in the decades since welfare reform have once again made
the program a subject of scrutiny (Dickert-Conlin et al., 2016). At the federal level, the Trump
administration seeks to cut spending on SNAP by $230 billion over ten years by restricting
eligibility, raising administrative burdens, imposing more stringent program rules, reducing
benefits, and limiting access to food (Rosenbaum & Nuerberger, 2020).40 If adopted, these
proposals would deny or reduce benefits to millions of adults as well as millions of children, who
make up 44 percent of all SNAP beneficiaries (Cronquist, 2019; Rosenbaum & Nuerberger,

40

Sonny Purdue, the United States Secretary of Agriculture under the Trump administration and head of the United
States Department of Agriculture, which administers SNAP, has referenced the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (colloquially referred to as “welfare reform”) and arguments motivating its
passage in defending proposals to reform the program (e.g., press release no. 0025.19, available at:
https://bit.ly/2VUQ0w4).
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2020).41 This despite evidence that current benefits are exhausted quickly upon receipt, forcing
many households to reduce their caloric intake towards the end of their benefits cycle (Shapiro,
2005; Todd, 2015; Smith et al., 2016).
To the extent that attitudes towards SNAP are group-centric and rooted in misconceptions
about the composition of its beneficiaries, highlighting the children it serves may make the
program more appealing to the public and politically sustainable. Highlighting the child
beneficiaries of the program—who presumably cannot be underserving of aid and draw more
empathy than adults—may induce greater support for it (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).
Alternatively, however, an emphasis on children may be “self-undermining” (e.g. Levine, 2015)
if it evokes thoughts of irresponsible parenting or out of wedlock births, thereby reinforcing
existing stereotypes or creating new ones, leading to a reduction in expressed support for the
program or no change at all. Whether accentuating children might alter support for SNAP is
therefore an empirical question.
This study investigates whether highlighting the child beneficiaries of SNAP can increase
support for the program and overcome racial antipathies using a large-scale survey experiment. I
first examine whether any frame evoking children—with and without imagery and regardless of
their race—is effective. I then investigate whether this effect varies by the type of frame used.
More specifically, I test whether imagery of children moderates the effect of simply mentioning
children, and whether the race of the children shown matters. I also examine differential
responsiveness to these frames across participants from politically influential social and
demographic groups. In several extensions, I explore whether these frames can alter how
strongly participants feel about their position on the program and their underlying motivations. I

41

These reforms may also have the secondary effect of depriving hundreds of thousands of children access to free and
reduced-price meals through the National School Lunch Program (Rosenbaum & Nuerberger, 2020).
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also assess the generalizability of these effects to another welfare program, the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which provides cash assistance to families with children.
This study makes three important contributions. First, while the literature on the political
and racial determinants of support for welfare programs is extensive, much less is known about
the conditions under which these programs may become “de-politicized” or “de-racialized”
(Winter, 2006). This study helps to fill this gap in the literature. In so doing, it also expands on
the group-centric model of public opinion by considering how different characteristics of a
group—in this case age and race—interact with deservingness to shape perceptions. Lastly, it
presents evidence that black children may not induce the same level of empathy among some
demographic and social groups as compared to white children.
To preview the main results, I find that highlighting the child beneficiaries of SNAP
induces greater support for the program overall, and that this effect is smaller when children are
characterized as black as compared to white. I also find that support increases among whites and
Republicans, and high- and middle-income households, though, again, less so when the child
beneficiaries are characterized as black. Only when race is not primed, or when children are
characterized as white or diverse, is support for TANF increased. In sum, while highlighting
children likely taps into ideas of deservingness that boost support for SNAP and TANF, these
beliefs are tempered by attitudes towards blacks.
Background on SNAP
In 2019, SNAP provided $56 billion in benefits to nearly 36 million Americans. Though
the primary aim of the program is to reduce food insecurity—defined as the lack of reliable
access to food necessary for a healthy, active lifestyle—it also serves as an anti-poverty program
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and an “automatic stabilizer” during economic downturns (Tiehen, Jolliffe, & Smeeding, 2015;
Blinder & Zandi, 2015; Keith-Jennings & Rosenbaum, 2015).
According to federal guidelines for SNAP, eligibility for the program requires that
household income not exceed 130% of the federal poverty level (FPL) and net income (gross
income less certain deductions) not exceed 100% of the FPL, as well as satisfying two asset tests.
Benefits are determined by subtracting 30% of net income from the maximum benefit
guaranteed, which varies by household size, and are distributed via a debit card system known as
Electronic Benefits Transfer. These benefits can only be used to purchase select foods at
authorized retailers. Beginning in the late 1990s and accelerating in the 2000s, states have been
afforded discretion over many aspects of the program’s implementation, and can relax eligibility
criteria, increase benefits generosity, and waive restrictions on the types of foods that can be
purchased with benefits.42 States are also responsible for setting the program’s rules, outreach
efforts, and sanctioning policies (Gabor et al., 2003).43,44
Additionally, ten states further delegate implementation of SNAP to county governments.
Although counties in these states are required to comply with specific federal or state mandates,
they are afforded considerable flexibility in implementing the program otherwise (National
Association of Counties, 2019). Street-level bureaucrats, such as case workers in local offices,
can also influence program outcomes by implementing the programs in ways that may encourage
or deter participation among prospective or current beneficiaries. For example, workers in local
offices can deter participation by creating an unwelcoming or stigmatizing atmosphere,

42

Though benefits generosity can be increased by adding to allowable deductions in the calculation of net income,
doing so does not significantly lower net income and benefits levels do not vary substantially across states.
43
These practices can include whether and what kind of information is disseminated about the program, whether or
not applicants can apply online, unannounced home visits to detect fraud, how often households need to recertify,
and the kind of sanctions that are imposed on households who fail to meet the program’s requirements.
44
For a more detailed overview of SNAP and its implementation, see Courtmanche et al. (2019).
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dedicating less time and fewer resources to outreach, or exerting little effort in guiding
prospective beneficiaries through the application process (Lopez-Landin, 2013; Kogan, 2017).
The devolution of the program has produced a wide array of eligibility criteria and
program rules that have contributed to large differences in participation rates among eligible
households across and within states (Kogan, 2017; Call & Shimada, 2018; Cunnyngham, 2019).
The lack of uniformity in the implementation of SNAP has implications for social equity and
economic inequality, expanding its reach and impact in some contexts while limiting them in
others (Dickert-Conlin, et al., 2016; Shaw, 2009). In fact, participation rates have been found to
be lower and application denial rates higher in jurisdictions with higher minority populations and
where support for redistributive government policies is lower (Kogan, 2017). Consequently, a
black household with children is more likely than a similar white household to live in a state or
county with more stringent eligibility criteria and program rules that might impede their access to
benefits.
To the extent that local political and social considerations reflect misconceptions about
SNAP beneficiaries and manifest in state and local policies through elected officials and
bureaucrats, adjusting these perceptions may bolster support for the programs and help to
minimize or eliminate disparities in its implementation.
Theoretical Framework and Relevant Literature
Public opinion influences policy through elected and appointed officials (Burstein, 2003;
Stimson, 2004). State and local lawmakers and bureaucrats may be responsive to their political
and social contexts for several reasons. First, they may be subject to political processes (e.g.,
elections or referrals) that require them to adhere to the policy preferences of their electorate.
Second, social pressures exerted by local interest groups or important constituencies (e.g.,
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wealthier residents) may constrain their behavior. Third, as members of the communities they
live or work in, they likely share the same preferences and attitudes as those of the majority in
their jurisdiction.
Public opinion can, in turn, be influenced by how those policies are presented, or framed
(Chong & Druckman, 2007). Government programs are often framed in ways that shape public
perceptions of the issues they are meant to address, thereby influencing attitudes towards the
policies themselves.45 These frames serve as heuristics that help individuals conceptualize
complex issues (e.g., poverty), suggest explanations for them (e.g. who bears responsibility),
standards for judging them (e.g. their consequences), and viable solutions (e.g. government
intervention) (Nelson & Kinder, 1996).
The effects of framing are particularly apparent with respect to welfare programs.
Although Americans consistently express support for greater assistance to the poor when asked
in abstract terms, many also consistently oppose government spending on aid to the poor when
questions about assistance are framed in terms of specific policies (Rasinski, 1989; Green &
Kern, 2012; Berinsky et al., 2012). The lack of support for welfare programs has been attributed
to racial bias against their presumed recipients and, more generally, perceptions of their
beneficiaries as undeserving of government aid.
In their study cataloging frames associated with welfare in the 1960s and 1970s, Gamson
& Lasch (1983) identified the “freeloader frame”—which advances the notion that many of the
poor are simply taking advantage of government assistance programs—as particularly pervasive.
This frame is also closely linked to racial attitudes towards blacks. As documented in detail in

45

Framing effects have been shown to alter support for Social Security (Winter, 2006), school vouchers (Brewer &
Gross, 2005), affirmative action (Kinder & Sanders, 1990), and government spending (Jacoby, 2000), among many
others. For more on framing theory and a review of the literature, please see Chong and Druckman (2007).
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Gilens (1999), decades of negative media coverage of poverty associated welfare, and its abuse,
with blacks lacking in work ethic.46 In fact, the relationship between opinions on welfare and
attitudes towards blacks is so strong as to suggest the two are nearly synonymous: mentioning
welfare, even absent any racial cues, elicits thoughts of blacks and their “moral failings.”
Research has consistently found antipathy towards blacks to be among the most important
determinants of weak support for welfare programs (Jacoby, 2000; Winter, 2006; Goren, 2008;
Ellis & Faricy, 2019). A separate strand of literature finds that states in which blacks constitute a
larger share of welfare caseloads have narrower eligibility criteria, more stringent program rules,
and less generous benefits (Soss et al., 2001; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004).
Public opinion on government programs is often group-centric in that it is influenced by
attitudes citizens possess toward the social or demographic groups perceived to be their
beneficiaries (Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Converse, 2006; Winter, 2008). Group-centric thinking is
not immutable, however. Just as public opinion has been conditioned by decades of media
coverage and political discourse to associate welfare programs with the undeserving, blacks, or
both, these same programs can be re-framed in ways that divert attention away from these groups
or accentuate other groups perceived as more deserving, thereby shifting opinion in favor of such
programs. Children, as among the main beneficiaries of welfare programs, may serve as one such
group, though studies evaluating the efficacy of frames using children are scarce, outdated, and
produce mixed results.47

46

Welfare is not as strongly associated with other minority groups. Whites generally have a far more favorable
opinion of Asians (who are often stereotyped as a “model minority”) and Hispanics as compared to blacks, Studies
examining the link between attitudes towards Hispanics and support for, or implementation of, welfare programs
have found mixed or null results (Soss et al., 2001; Schram et al., 2009; Hussey & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013). In
contrast, support for welfare programs and their implementation has consistently been linked to attitudes about
blacks. For this reason, this study focuses primarily on whites and blacks, rather than Hispanics or Asians.
47
Using the typology developed by Schneider and Ingram (1993), perceptions of “dependents,” like children, are
shaped by positive frames and they are considered more deserving of aid.
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In a lab experiment, Iyengar (1990) finds that while participants exposed to a treatment
mimicking news coverage of children affected by poverty expressed more sympathy than those
in a similar treatment using adults, the mostly white participants expressed less sympathy when
the coverage involved black children as compared to white children. Supplementing these results
with data from a nationally representative survey, Iyengar (1990) also found greater support for
families described as having larger numbers of children, though the vignettes used did not vary
descriptions of the families by race.
In another lab experiment, Nelson and Oxley (1999) tested support for a family cap
limiting welfare benefits for families with children across groups of participants exposed to an
article emphasizing the potential consequences it would have for child poverty together with a
picture of a black boy and an article emphasizing the importance of personal responsibility and
the need to disincentivize child birth among those who could not support their families together
with a picture of a black woman and four children. Although no difference was found between
the two groups in their support for the family cap, those presented with the picture of the child
were more likely to believe in the importance of protecting poor children.
This study updates and improves upon this literature. In addition to the mixed findings of
these previous studies, decades of social, economic, and political developments leave the
question of whether framing welfare programs as benefiting children can alter public support for
them unresolved.48 I improve on previous work by conducting a survey experiment using a larger
and more diverse sample as opposed to a lab experiment relying on small samples made up of
local white (or predominantly white) volunteers. The use of a survey experiment has the added

48

One particularly noteworthy development has been the treatment of undocumented children crossing into the
United States, which has garnered significant media attention in recent years and become a highly politicized and
polarizing issue.
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advantage of testing frames in the real-world settings in which individuals formulate their
opinions, and my more diverse sample allows for heterogeneity analysis across participants from
diverse backgrounds. Additionally, this study extends the literature in several ways.
Nelson and Kinder (1996) find that the addition of an image to a frame can have a
substantial impact on its efficacy. I assess the moderating effect that imagery of children can
have on a frame only mentioning children. They also show that group-centric thinking can be
shaped by multiple features of a single target group in ways that may compound or counteract
each other. I therefore also explore the interaction of age and race with perceived deservingness.
While children may be considered more deserving in general, their characterization as black may
evoke negative stereotypes that negate perceptions of their deservingness. In contrast, white
children may evoke positive stereotypes that raises perceptions of their deservingness.
Existing research also finds consistent links between being white, high income, or
politically conservative with lower support for cash and food assistance (e.g., Jacoby, 2000; Soss
et al., 2001; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Winter, 2006). I leverage the diversity of my sample to
investigate how framing SNAP as benefiting children can boost support for the program across
these politically influential groups. Going beyond gauging changes in support for SNAP, I also
document how different frames highlighting children affect the motivations underlying expressed
preferences. Specifically, I track changes in beliefs commonly tied to support for welfare,
including deservingness, egalitarianism, and attitudes towards government (Ellis & Faricy,
2019).
Finally, I explore the efficacy of a frame highlighting children in the context of TANF.49
Unlike SNAP, which provides benefits that can only be used for the purchase of food, TANF

49

The aims of TANF include the provision of aid to needy families with children, promoting employment,
preventing and reducing out of wedlock pregnancies, and encouraging marriage. Total federal and state TANF
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provides cash-assistance. States also have far more discretion in implementing TANF, resulting
in even starker differences in participation rates and benefits levels across the country that
reinforce social inequity and economic inequality (Floyd, 2020; Thompson, 2018). How
programs are designed can also influence public opinion, and direct cash payments are
particularly unpopular (Shaw, 2009; Ellis & Faricy, 2019). As such, effects may vary across the
two programs.
A priori, relative to no mention or imagery of children, I expect that frames highlighting
children will induce greater support for SNAP, that the use of imagery will boost this effect, and
that induced support will be lower when children are characterized as black as compared to
white. I also expect whites, Republicans, and those from middle- and high-income household to
be responsive, though less responsive than their black, Democrat, and low-income counterparts. I
have no a prior expectations as to how effects might vary across SNAP and TANF.
Experimental Design, Data, and Sample
Experimental Design
I employ a survey experiment in which participants are randomized into a control
condition or one of four treatment conditions. A randomized survey experiment is ideal as it
allows for an evaluation of the causal impact of the treatments as they might be employed in real
world settings. In each condition, participants are presented nine statements pertaining to the
spending activities of various organizations, including governments, non-profits, and for-profit

expenditures amounted to $31.3 billion in 2018, only $6.7 billion of which was dedicated to cash assistance. federal
guidelines only require that benefits receipt be tied to work activities, and that states not provide cash assistance
from federal funds to families that include an adult recipient for longer than 60 months (with some exceptions) and
to legal immigrants who have not lived in the country for at least five years. Illegal immigrants are barred from any
assistance through either federal or state TANF funds. Otherwise, states can choose what services to provide and can
set their own eligibility criteria, outreach efforts, program rules, sanctioning policies, and benefits levels. The overall
effect of devolution on cash assistance has been particularly stark. Participation rates vary from 4 percent in
Louisiana to 68 percent in California (Floyd, 2020), and benefits vary from $170 per month for a family of three
with no income in Mississippi to $923 for the same family in Alaska (Thompson, 2018).
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businesses. In the order that they appear in the survey, these are the state government of
California (California), Johnson & Johnson (J&J), the federal government (for SNAP), Susan G.
Komen (Komen), Amazon, government of New York City (NYC), Walmart, the National
Football League (NFL), and state and federal governments (for TANF). After being presented
with a statement, participants are asked whether they think spending on the specified activity
should be increased, decreased, or remain unchanged, how strongly they feel about their
spending preference, and the reasons motivating their choice. Asking about spending preferences
in this way is frequently used to gauge support for government programs and taps into general
sentiments about them (Stimson, 2004; Winter, 2006). The survey concludes with an attention
check question followed by a questionnaire collecting data on participant’s socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics.50
Participants in all conditions are presented the same set of statements, the exceptions
being those pertaining to SNAP and TANF, which are altered to mention children in the
treatment conditions. These statements are shown in Figure 10. In the Control condition,
participants are provided a statement that explains what SNAP and TANF are and how much
they cost with no mention of the children served by the programs.51 In the first treatment
condition, Text Only (TO), both statements are altered to mention children. Participants in the
remaining three conditions are presented the same statements as those in the Text Only condition
together with an image.

The attention check questions present a statement about a for-profit company’s spending on an activity but also
instructs participants to ignore the statement and select “remain unchanged.”
51
This is commonly how public opinion polls ask such questions. For example, from a 2018 Politico-Harvard poll:
“Another part of the US Farm Bill is support for SNAP, the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, formerly
known as food stamps. This program provides government-supported food purchasing assistance to millions of lowincome people in the US. In the new Farm Bill, do you think federal spending on the SNAP or food stamp program
should be increased, decreased or kept about the same?”
50
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These images are shown in Figure 11 The images accompanying the SNAP and TANF
statements for those in the Text & Diverse Image (TDI) condition show children of varying racial
and ethnic backgrounds so as to avoid contaminating this condition with the race-specific images
those in the Text & Black Image (TBI) and Text & White Image (TWI) are exposed to. The
images accompanying the SNAP statement in the latter two treatment conditions depict a black
and white boy-girl pair, respectively. As three quarters of all child beneficiaries of SNAP are
below the age of eleven, the images were chosen so as to depict young children.52,53 While the
TANF statements in the Text & Black Image and Text & White Image conditions are
accompanied by the same racially and ethnically diverse image that appears in the Text &
Diverse Image condition, the racial framing is primed by the race-based images accompanying
the preceding SNAP statement. In other words, given the sequence in which statements appear,
participants in the image treatments are exposed to a single image when asked about spending on
SNAP, and two images when asked about spending on TANF (the earlier SNAP image as well as
the TANF image).
After participants indicate their preferred spending position in response to each statement,
a follow-up question asks them to indicate how strongly they feel about their position by
choosing a number on a continuous scale that ranges from 0 (“Not that strongly”) to 3 (“Very
strongly”).54 Depending on their spending preference (increase, decrease, or remain unchanged),
they are then presented with a list of reasons that may have motivated their position, covering
the: (1) assistance beneficiaries of an activity are receiving, (2) extent of an entity’s involvement

52

In 2018, 29.4% of child beneficiaries of SNAP were between 0-4 years old, 17.9% were between 5-7, 24.3% were
between 8-11, and 19.9% were between 12-15 years (Cronquist, 2019).
53
These images were shown to 100 participants in a separate survey conducted using Lucid. Participants were asked
to indicate what age they believed the children in the images to be. The average age for the SNAP images were 5.6,
7.6, and 8.9 across the Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image conditions,
respectively. The average age for the TANF image was 9.6.
54
On this scale, 1 and 2 indicate “Somewhat strongly” and “Strongly,” respectively.
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an activity, (3) use of resources for an activity, (4) desirability of an activity, (5) and an entity’s
wastefulness in performing the activity. For each reason, they are asked to specify a number on a
continuous scale ranging from 0 (“Not important”) to 3 (“Very important”).55 These are
presented in Figure 12. In the context of SNAP and TANF, these motivations are used to
capture beliefs about deservingness (1), government involvement (2), egalitarianism (3 & 4), and
government efficiency (5).
To mask the objective of the experiment, the SNAP and TANF statements are embedded
among statements covering other activities carried out by various organizations that are all
charitable in nature and which benefit individuals. These statements are also accompanied by
images in the treatment conditions involving imagery. The images associated with each
statement were chosen to be relevant to the activity specified, and are shown in Figure A3 of the
Appendix.
In order to minimize any priming or anchoring effects, participants are first exposed to
two statements covering the activities of a state government (California) and a for-profit firm
(Johnson & Johnson) and two varying levels of expenditures ($75 billion and $9 billion,
respectively) so as to assuage suspicions that the experiment is intended to gauge support for
government spending on a particular program and avoid having respondents base their
evaluations relative to the lower or higher spending levels of other organizations. Participants are
then presented the statement pertaining to SNAP. The survey then continues with five more
statements covering the activities and expenditures of other entities, with the statement about
TANF appearing last in the sequence. The survey statements are presented in Figure A4 of the
Appendix.

55

On this scale, 1 and 2 indicate “Somewhat important” and “Important,” respectively.
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Data
The survey experiment was administered by Lucid between February 20th and March 6th
of 2020 and involved 3,878 participants. Lucid recruits adult participants from a large and
diverse pool of respondents and uses a quota sampling procedure to construct samples
demographically similar to the general population as reflected in the United States Census across
age gender, ethnicity, and region.56 Samples collected using Lucid have been shown to closely
mirror probability-based samples of the broader population and have been used to successfully
replicate survey experiments relying on both convenience and probability-based samples
(Coppock and McClellan, 2019).57
As mentioned above, all participants were asked questions pertaining to their
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, including their gender, age, race, ethnicity,
household income, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status, utilization of
social assistance programs, political party affiliation, and political ideology. This information
was supplemented with data collected by Lucid on educational attainment and region of
residence.58
I used this information to create a set of indicator variables for whether a participant: is
female; is young, middle aged, or elderly; is Hispanic, white (white), black (black), or other

56

See Coppock and McClellan (2019) for additional details about Lucid and its sampling procedure.
Lucid offers several advantages over Amazon’s MTurk services, which has been widely used to test social
scientific experiments (until recently, Lucid catered primarily to market research firms). First, Lucid taps into a
larger and more diverse pool of respondents. Second, samples collected using Lucid better reflect the demographic,
political, and psychological profiles of the general population. Third, critics argue that MTurk samples include
respondents that are “overfished,” “professionalized,” and potentially fraudulent (e.g., bots). In contrast, 375,000
unique respondents pass through Lucid’s “marketplace” each day and there has been no evidence of fraudulent
responses to date.
58
Lucid also provides data on respondents gender, age, race, ethnicity, household income, and political party
affiliation. Comparing the data on these characteristics provided by Lucid to those collected as part of the survey
reveals few discrepancies. Whenever possible, I use the variables collected as part of the survey in my analysis as
they are more comprehensive. As a robustness check, I use the data provided by Lucid. Results are substantively
similar and available upon request.
57
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(Asian, Native American, or Pacific Islander); has a bachelor’s degree or higher; comes from a
low, middle, or high income household; was born in the United States; is married; is a parent; is
employed; is on social assistance; is a Democrat (dem), Republican (repub), or
Independent/other (Green Party, Libertarian Party, or other); is liberal, conservative, or
moderate; or resides in the South, Northeast, Midwest, or West. I also create variables for
whether a participant is non-white (nonwhite), non-black (nonblack), non-Republican
(nonrepub), and non-Democrat (nondem), and non-high- (nonhighinc), non-middle(nonmiddleinc), and non-low income (nonlowinc).
My key measures of interest include a set of binary variables indicating whether a
participant was assigned to the Control, Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image,
or Text & White Image condition. These variables take a value of 1 if the participant was
assigned to the condition and 0 otherwise. Similarly, I create two additional binary variables
indicating assignment to any of the treatment conditions (AnyTreat) and any of the image
treatment conditions (AnyImageTreat). My primary outcome measure, Increase SNAP, captures
support for SNAP and takes a value of 1 if a participant indicated a preference for increased
spending on the program and 0 if their preference was for spending to remain unchanged or be
decreased. I also create two alternative sets of outcome measures. To gauge shifts in preferences
away from decreased spending and allow for a more expansive definition of support, Increase or
No Change SNAP takes a value of 1 if a participant preferred spending to remain unchanged or
be increased, and 0 otherwise. The second is a categorical variable, Spending SNAP, that takes a
value of 0, 1, or 2 if a participant preferred spending to decrease, remain unchanged, or increase,
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respectively. I create variables Increase TANF, Increase or No Change TANF, and Spending
TANF similarly to capture support for TANF.59
To represent how strongly participants feel about their indicated spending preference, I
create continuous variables Strength SNAP and Strength TANF ranging from 0 (“Not that
strongly”) to 3 (“Very strongly”). I create continuous variables corresponding to each of the
reasons that may have motivated participants’ chosen spending preferences similarly. These are
Assistance, Involvement, Resources, Desirability, and Wastefulness. Finally, I create a set of
indicator variables capturing preferences for increased spending on activities carried out by the
other entities included in the survey. These include California, J&J, Komen, Amazon, NYC,
Walmart, and NFL, and take a value of 1 if participants indicated a preference for increased
spending and 0 otherwise.

Analytic Sample
The analytic sample includes 3,106 that passed the attention check embedded in the
survey. Column 1 of Table 13 presents summary statistics for this sample. The majority of
respondents are between the ages of 35 and 64. A majority also report having children,
household incomes between $25,000 and $74,999, being female, and being employed. The
sample is ethnically and racially diverse, with 13 percent being Hispanic, 74 percent white, 12
percent black, and 14 percent “other” (Asian, Native American, or Pacific Islander).60 A third of
the sample has a bachelor’s degree or higher, 44 percent are married, and 26 percent report

59

It should be noted that it is possible for a participant to support SNAP or TANF but also believe that existing
spending levels on the programs are adequate or perhaps higher than what is optimal. If so, they may express a
preference for spending on the programs to remain unchanged or be decreased and the Increase SNAP and Increase
TANF measures will underestimate the extent of support. This problem is somewhat ameliorated by the more
expansive Increase or No Change SNAP and Increase or No Change TANF measures. These measures are not likely
to result in an overestimation of support, however, as it is unlikely that a participant opposing the programs would
prefer for their spending to be increased or remain unchanged.
60
A participant may identify as both ethnically Hispanic and racially white, black, or other.
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receiving some social assistance (e.g., unemployment insurance). Nearly the entire sample
reports being born in the United States. With regards to political party affiliation, a plurality of
the sample identifies as Democrat, with equal shares identifying as Republican and independent
or other (Libertarian Party or Green Party). Ideologically, the sample is roughly divided equally
across liberal, conservative, and moderate.
For comparison with the analytic sample, columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 13 present
profiles of the general population as captured by the American Community Survey (ACS) for
2017, the General Social Survey (GSS) for 2018, and Gallup for February 2020.61 Along most
dimensions, the analytic sample appears very similar to either the ACS sample, the GSS sample,
or both, even across characteristics that are not used by Lucid in its quota sampling procedure as
seen in Panel B. Minor discrepancies are likely attributable to differences in the year data was
collected and sampling variability inherent to probability-based samples. Some differences are
large, however.
The analytic sample is younger, with 32 percent of participants between the ages of 18 to
34, compared to 23 percent in the ACS and 27 percent in the GSS. A larger fraction of the
analytic sample, 51 percent, report a household income of between $25,000 and $74,999, as
compared to 39 percent in the ACS. As such, the analytic sample has fewer respondents
reporting a household income of $75,000 or greater than the ACS, 24 percent relative to 40
percent. As previously mentioned, 95 percent of the analytic sample reports being born in the
United States as compared to 86 and 87 percent in the ACS and GSS, respectively. Perhaps most
notably, as compared to Gallup polling, more of the analytic sample identifies as Democrat and a
smaller share identifies as independent or other.

61

The 2017 ACS, 2018 GSS, and 2020 Gallup data are the most recent releases available.
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Unsurprisingly, these discrepancies may cast doubt on the representativeness of any
treatment effects identified in the analytic sample as estimates of their true value in the general
population. Nevertheless, absent any theoretical reason to the contrary, this study can still
provide insights about the causal relationships between the treatments tested and their outcomes
in the general population.62 Given the diversity of the analytic sample on important
characteristics and its similarity to nationally representative probability-based samples, there is
no reason to believe that participation in the survey is correlated with opinions towards spending
on SNAP and TANF in a way that might skew the results. As such, any observed shift in
preferences for spending on SNAP and TANF in response to the treatments in the analytic
sample can help inform our understanding of how such opinions might be expected to change in
response to similar treatments in the general population.63
Table 14 presents summary statistics across the control and treatment conditions.
Balancing tests reveal no meaningful differences across the treatment conditions relative to the
control condition.64 Comparing the spending preferences of those in the analytic sample assigned
to the control condition to that found by a similar survey using a probability-based sample—
noting sampling variability and differences in data collection years—further boosts the case for
the generalizability of this study’s finding to the broader population. Overall, in the case of

Under the “fit-for-purpose” framework recommended by the American Association of Public Opinion Research
(AAPOR), the choice between using a probability-based sample and a convenience sample depends on a study’s
objective (Baker et al., 2013). While descriptive work necessarily requires a probability-based sample, a
convenience sample may be appropriate for research focused on documenting relationships between variables. See
Baker et al. (2013) and Coppock and McClellan (2019) for additional details about the “fit-for-purpose” framework.
63
In fact, many relationships between treatments targeting public opinion and their outcomes identified using
convenience samples recruited through online platforms (e.g., Facebook, Qualtrics, MTurk, and Lucid) have been
found to map onto the general population (Mullinix et al., 2015; Levay et al., 2016; Coppock et al., 2018; Coppock,
2019; Coppock and McClellan, 2019; Boas et al., 2020).
64
The observed discrepancies across the treatment conditions relative to the control condition are not unusual given
the small sample sizes involved, even with randomization. F-tests for joint significance did not indicate any
statistically significant differences across the treatment conditions relative to the control condition, indicating
balance across the conditions. Only 7 of 112 t-tests on difference-in-means relative to the control condition were
statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value≤0.10), less than what might be expected by chance.
62
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SNAP, 19.7, 37.7, and 42.6 percent of those in the control condition preferred that spending be
decreased, remain unchanged, or increased, respectively. Quite similarly, a July 2018 PoliticoHarvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health survey found the share of respondents preferring a
decrease, no change, or increase in spending to be 19, 39, and 37 percent, respectively. Breaking
down spending preferences across the two by political party affiliation also shows that the
analytic sample is remarkably representative. Among Republicans in the control condition, 35.4,
39.2, and 25.4 percent preferred that spending be decreased, remain unchanged, or increased,
compared to 39, 44, and 13 percent in the probability-based sample. Among democrats, these
figures are 9.1, 35.3, and 55.6 percent, and 7, 27, and 63 percent, for decreased spending, no
change, or increased spending, respectively, across the two surveys.65
Analysis
For ease of interpretation, I use a baseline linear probability model for the main analysis.
This model takes the following form:
Outcomeit = β0 + δTreatment Conditionit + λCovariatesit + εit
where subscripts i and t represent participant and control or treatment condition, respectively.
Depending on the specification, Outcomei is either Increase SNAP or Increase or No Change
SNAP. When examining the effect of being assigned to any of the treatment conditions,
Treatment Conditionit is AnyTreat (with Control as the reference group). In regressions

65

An analogous survey gauging public opinion on TANF or cash assistance by asking about spending preferences
could not be found. However, the results from a poll conducted by Pew Research in September of 2019 found that,
among those who agreed that there was too much income inequality in the United States, the vast majority preferred
that the government invest in education and job training for the poor rather than provide direct assistance in the form
of cash or tax credits overall and across income and political party affiliation (Horowitz, Igielnik, & Kochhar, 2020).
Differences in survey design and subsampling aside, this is consistent with the preferences of those in the analytic
sample assigned to the control condition, the majority of whom favored that spending on TANF be decreased or
remain unchanged overall, across political party affiliation (with the exception of Democrats), and household
income.
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disentangling the effect by type of treatment, Treatment Conditionit is either a vector of binary
variables indicating whether a participant is in the Text Only or AnyImageTreat conditions, or the
Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, or Text & White Image conditions (with
Control as the reference group). To increase the precision of my estimates, Covariatesit is a
vector of variables capturing participant characteristics, including gender, age, race, ethnicity,
educational attainment, household income, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment
status, utilization of social assistance programs, political party affiliation, and region. I test the
sensitivity of the results to the choice of a linear probability model by supplementing the analysis
with logit and generalized ordered logit models. For the latter, I substitute Spending SNAP in
place of the binary outcomes. When examining support for TANF, the outcome measures are
Increase TANF, Increase or No Change TANF, or Spending TANF.66
To investigate differential responsiveness to the treatments across race, political party
affiliation, and household income, I run separate regressions for each characteristic using the
baseline model amended to include interactions as follows:
Outcomeit = β0 + δTreatment Conditionit*Characteristicit+ λCovariatesit + εit
For example, when investigating the effect of the treatments on whites, I interact white with Text
Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image, and nonwhite with
control, Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image such
that the reference group is whites assigned to the control condition. I do this similarly with black
and nonblack, repub and nonrepub, dem and nondem, highinc and nonhighinc, middleinc and
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To further verify that results are not sensitive to the coding scheme used to measure the outcomes of interest, two
other sets of “continuous” measures are also used as outcomes. For the first set, preferences for decreased spending,
no change, and increased spending take values of -1, 0, and 1, respectively. For the second set, these preferences
take on values of 0, 0.5, and 1, respectively. Results remain consistent and are available upon request.
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nonmiddleinc, and lowinc and nonlowinc to investigate the effect on blacks, Republicans, and
Democrats, and those from high-, middle-, and low- income households.
As extensions, I also explore how the treatments affect how strongly participants feel
about their spending preference and the reasons motivating their decision. To assess changes in
the strength of participants’ spending preferences, the baseline model is estimated with Strength
SNAP and Strength TANF as the outcomes. To examine their motivation, the outcomes used are
Assistance, Involvement, Resources, Desirability, and Wastefulness. I run this analysis on
subsamples stratified by spending preference. Finally, to check that any observed treatment
effects are the result of the interventions employed and not some unintended manipulation, I
assess the effect of assignment to the treatment conditions on preferences for increased spending
on other activities. This is done by substituting California, J&J, Komen, Amazon, NYC, Walmart,
and NFL for the outcome measures in the baseline model.
Main Results
Treatment Effects on Support for SNAP
Figure 13 depicts the percent of participants in each condition indicating a preference for
increased spending on SNAP. The dashed horizontal line represents the share in the control
condition. Participants expressed a greater preference for increased spending on SNAP across all
treatment conditions relative to the control condition, though the difference is smaller and not
statistically significant in the Text & Black Image condition. Figure 14 presents the regression
results.
Beginning with Panel A, the overall effect of highlighting the child beneficiaries of
SNAP is to increase support for the program relative to the control condition. Assignment to any
of the treatment conditions raises the likelihood that participants express a preference for
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increased spending on the program by 7.9 percentage points. In panel B, the effect is allowed to
vary across the different treatments. Interestingly, mentioning children with and without imagery
has the same effect on support for SNAP, increasing the likelihood of preferring increased
spending on the program by 7.8 and 7.9 percentage points relative to the control condition.
However, disaggregating further reveals qualitatively meaningful differences in the efficacy of
the different treatments employing imagery, though the estimates are not statistically
distinguishable from one another. Accompanying the statement mentioning children with an
image of a diverse group of children has a moderating effect, raising the likelihood of preferring
increased spending to 10.2 percentage points. When the image is that of black children, however,
the combined effect of mentioning children and imagery is lower than either only mentioning
children or doing so together with an image of diverse children, increasing the likelihood by only
5.8 percentage points. Mentioning children together with an image of white children raises the
likelihood by 7.8 percentage points.
Results from logit and generalized ordered logit models are consistent with these
findings, revealing similar patterns as seen in Appendix Table A25. Relative to the share of
participants indicating a preference for increased spending on SNAP (42.6 percent) in the control
condition, these constitute large effects. The effect of the Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text
& Black Image, and Text & White Image treatments is to increase preference for more spending
on SNAP by 18 to 24 percent.

Shifting Preferences Away from Decreased Spending
Since SNAP is the target of reforms intended to reign in its scope and coverage, whether
attitudes towards children can help to maintain at least existing levels of expenditures on the
programs may also be important. Figure 14 also presents the estimated treatment effects on the
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likelihood of preferring that spending be increased or remaining unchanged. Using this more
expansive measure of support for the program reveals the same patterns as before. As seen in
Panel A, highlighting children is effective for increasing support for SNAP, raising the
likelihood that participants prefer spending on the program to be increased or remain unchanged
by 6.4 percentage points relative to the control condition. Letting the effect vary by the type of
treatment in Panel B again shows the effects of mentioning children with and without imagery to
be similar, raising the likelihood by 6.1 and 6.6 percentage points, respectively. Further
disaggregating the results reveals qualitatively meaningful and statistically distinguishable
differences, however.
These effects are 6.1, 9.1, 4.8, and 5.8 percentage across the Text Only, Text & Diverse
Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image treatments, respectively. The effect of the
Text & Diverse Image treatment is statistically distinguishable from the others. The effect of only
mentioning children is moderated by the addition of an image of a diverse group of children (pvalue=0.095). An image of a diverse group of children is also more effective than when the
children are characterized as black (p-value=0.022) or white (p-value=0.082). Also notable is
that the gap between effects when images of black and white children are displayed is now
smaller.
As before, results from logit and generalized ordered logit models are consistent with
these findings, as seen in Appendix Table A25. To get a better sense of how preferences are
changing, Figure 15 shows the distribution of spending preferences for SNAP across the control
and treatment conditions. Comparing the distribution of spending preferences in the treatment
conditions to that of the control condition suggests that preferences are being shifted away from
decreased spending and towards increased spending.
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Differential Responsiveness Across Participants
Panel A of Figure 16 shows preferences for spending on SNAP among participants in the
control condition by race, political party, and income. Non-whites, Democrats, and low-income
participants express support for increased spending at higher levels than whites, Republicans,
and those from middle- and high-income households. This variation suggests that participants
from diverse backgrounds may be differentially responsive to the treatments. Table 15 presents
the regression results by participant characteristics. The same pattern as before emerges across
whites, Republicans, and those from high- and middle-income households, with greater increases
in the likelihood of participants preferring more spending in response to the Text Only, Text &
Diverse Image, and Text & White Image treatments as compared to the Text & Black Image
treatment.
Among whites, the Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text &
White Image treatments raise the likelihood of preferring increased spending on SNAP relative to
the control condition by 6.2, 13.7, 5.7, and 11.3 percentage points, respectively. Notably, the
estimated effect is smaller when children are characterized as black as compared to white or
diverse, differences that are statistically significant.67 Similarly, among Republicans, the
estimated coefficients are 10.2, 8.6, 3.3, and 7.3 percentage points, though the latter two are
statistically insignificant. Relative to the share of Republicans in the control condition preferring
more spending on the program (25 percent), the effects of the Text Only and Text & Diverse
Image treatments constitute increases of 40.8 and 34.4 percent, respectively. The magnitude of
the estimates do not vary substantially across the different treatments for those from high-income

These effects are statistically distinguishable from one another at conventional levels (p-value≤0.10), with the
exception of the Text Only & Text & Black Image, Text Only & Text & White Image, and Text & Diverse Image &
Text & White Image conditions.
67
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households, hovering around 7 and 9 percentage points, and are statistically significant only
when children are mentioned together with an image of a diverse group of children.68
Participants from middle-income households are more responsive than their higher-income
counterparts.69
Among blacks, simply mentioning children has a large effect, raising the likelihood of
preferring increased spending on SNAP by 16.7 percentage points, a 32 percent increase over the
share of blacks preferring more spending in the control condition (53 percent).70 Interestingly,
blacks are not responsiveness to treatments that include imagery of a diverse group of children or
white children, the estimates for which are negative, qualitatively small, and statistically
insignificant. Although the effect when children are characterized as black is statistically
insignificant, it is a qualitatively large 10.6 percentage points. Democrats, are roughly similarly
responsive across all treatments. Considering that support for SNAP among democrats is high at
nearly 56 percent in the control condition, these effects suggest that there is still room for
bolstering support for the program among this demographic. Preferences for increased spending
on SNAP are not altered among those from low-income households, who already support the
program at higher levels than any another group.71
These results suggest that highlighting the children that benefit from SNAP can boost
support for the program among whites, Republicans, and high- and middle-income households,
key social and demographic groups with substantial political influence. Who the child
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Effects across treatment conditions among Republicans and those from high-income households are not
statistically distinguishable from one another.
69
The effects for the Text Only and Text & Diverse Image treatments are statistically distinguishable from that of the
TIB treatment at conventional levels (p-value≤0.10).
70
The effect of Text Only is statistically distinguishable from that of the Text & Diverse Image and Text & White
Image conditions at conventional levels (p-value≤0.10).
71
Effects across treatments conditions among Democrats and those from low-income households are not statistically
distinguishable from one another.

125

beneficiaries are matters, however. The induced support for SNAP is smaller when the children
are characterized as black as compared to white or racially and ethnically diverse. These results
also suggest that highlighting child beneficiaries can also increase support for the program
among groups that already lean towards supporting the program, such as Democrats and blacks.
Extensions
Strength of Preference and Motivation
Table 16 shows how the strength of participant’s spending preference for SNAP was
affected by the different treatments relative to the control condition, separately across
participants who expressed a preference for spending to be decreased, remain unchanged, or
increased. Among those that preferred decreased spending, the coefficient estimates are mostly
negative—indicating that attitudes toward lower spending may be less firmly held than before—
though none are statistically significant. This result is in line with the finding that shifts in
attitudes towards increased spending on the program may be occurring primarily among those
who would have otherwise preferred decreased spending. The Text & Black Image and Text &
White Image treatments strengthened attitudes towards spending preferences among those that
preferred spending to remain unchanged. These effects constitute 8.9 and 7.5 percent increases in
strength of preference, respectively, relative to an average score of 1.7 among those in the
control condition. Among participants who indicated a preference for increased spending, only
the Text & White Image treatment altered the strength of attitudes, by 3.7 percent relative to an
average score of 2.46 in the control condition.
The results for participants motivation among those who preferred spending to be
decreased, remain unchanged, or increased are shown in Table 17. Beginning with the results in
Panel A, participants who indicated a preference for decreased spending scored the statement
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that program beneficiaries could be “doing more to help themselves” (Assistance) lower in terms
of importance in response to the Text Only and Text & Black Image treatments. These effects are
qualitatively large, constituting decreases of 9.6 and 8.1 percent relative to an average score 2.41
among those in the control condition, and suggest that participants may be more likely to view
SNAP beneficiaries, including black beneficiaries, as deserving of aid when children are
highlighted.
In Panel B, among those preferring no change in spending, the Text & Black Image
treatment led to increases in how important participants felt about the statements that
beneficiaries are “getting the assistance they need” (Assistance) and that the “government is as
involved as it should be in food assistance” (Involvement). Relative to the average score in the
control condition, these effects constituted increases of 10.3 and 9.7 percent, respectively. Lastly,
among those that preferred increased spending in Panel C, only the Text & White Image
treatment altered motivations, increasing the importance that participants put on the statements
that spending on food assistance is a “desirable thing to do” (Desirability) by 3.3 percent relative
to the average score in the control condition, respectively. This suggests that egalitarian
sentiments are stronger when children receiving benefits are characterized as white.
Treatment Effects on support for TANF
As mentioned above, SNAP and TANF differ in their design, with the former providing
benefits that can only be spent on food and the latter providing direct cash assistance. As such,
the effect of highlighting children on support may differ across the two programs. As seen in
Figure 13, preferences for increased spending on TANF is generally lower relative to that for
SNAP. Regression results for TANF are presented in Table 18. Beginning with column 1 and
Panel A, highlighting children raises the likelihood of preferring increased spending on TANF by
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4.1 percentage points relative to the control condition. As seen in Panel C, however, the effect is
driven by the priming of white children, which raises the likelihood of preferring increased
spending by 9 percentage points, an increase of 21.4 percent relative to the share of participants
preferring increased spending in the control condition.72
Expanding the definition of support to include preferences for spending to remain
unchanged in column 2 reveals similar patterns as in the case of SNAP, though the estimated
effects are less pronounced. Focusing on Panel C, the Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, and Text
& White Image conditions raise the likelihood of support for preferring spending to be increased
or remain unchanged by 4.1, 5.5, and 3.5 percentage points relative to the control condition,
respectively. The effect when black children are primed is qualitatively smaller and statistically
insignificant.73,74 Figure 17 shows that preferences for spending on TANF are being shifted
away from decreased spending to no change, with the exception of the Text & White Image
condition, which shifts preferences away from decreased spending and towards increased
spending.
As in the case of SNAP, support for increased spending on TANF varies across
participants in a similar manner, as shown in Panel B of Figure 7. Table 19 presents the
regression results across race, political party, and household income. Among whites,
Republicans, Democrats, and those from high, middle, and low-income households, only when
priming white children are the estimates meaningfully large, though only that for whites and
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The effect of Text & White Image is statistically different than each of the effects of Text Only, Text & Diverse
Image, and Text & Black Image at conventional levels (p-value≤0.10)
73
The effects of Text & Diverse Image and Text & Black Image are statistically different from one another at
conventional levels (p-value≤0.10).
74
As in the case of SNAP, results from logit and generalized ordered logit models are consistent with these findings,
revealing similar patterns for as seen in Appendix Table A25.
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Republicans is statistically significant. Those from middle-income households and Republicans
are also responsive when children are mentioned without any racial cues or characterized as
racially and ethnically diverse, respectively. In the case of TANF, the treatments did little to alter
how strongly participants felt about their preferred spending on the program, except to soften
attitudes among those who preferred decreased spending in the Text Only condition. Results are
shown in Appendix Table A26.
The Text Only and Text & Black Image treatments lower the importance that participants
preferring decreased spending placed on the statements that the “government should not be
involved in cash assistance” (Involvement) and that spending on cash assistance is “not good a
use of resources” (Resources) by 13.2 and 11.3 percent, respectively, relative to average scores
in the control condition. The former result suggests that aversion to government intervention was
less forceful when children were highlighted, while the latter suggests that the depiction of black
children activates more egalitarian sentiments. There were no statistically significant changes in
motivations among participants preferring spending to remain unchanged or be increased.
Results are shown in Appendix Table A27.
Probing the Results
Sample Composition
I test the sensitivity of the main results to sample composition in two ways. First, I
expand the analytic sample to include all participants, regardless of whether they passed the
attention check question. Unsurprisingly, and as seen in Table A28 of the Appendix, those who
did and did not pass the attention check differ markedly. Using this more inclusive sample does
not substantively alter the conclusions, however. Panel A of Table A29 in the Appendix presents
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the results, showing the same patterns as observed using the analytic sample.75 Again, this
bolsters the case for the generalizability of the results. Second, I restrict the analytic sample to
only include participants who spent at least 5 minutes and no more than 25 minutes on the survey
so as to exclude potentially anomalous responses from participants who may have spent too
little or too much time answering the questions. Again, the results are substantively similar, as
seen in Panel B of Table A29 in the Appendix.
Manipulation Checks
If the shifts in spending preferences are in response to the specific interventions
employed and not some unintended manipulation, assignment to the treatment conditions would
not be expected to have much of an effect, if any, on spending preferences for activities
conducted by other entities. As seen in Panel A of Table A30 in the Appendix, with a few
exceptions, assignment to the treatment conditions had no effect on preferences for increased
spending on other activities. Most estimates are qualitatively small and statistically insignificant.
Given that these results are based on comparisons with the control condition, the use of images
could be a source of variation that may account for the observed statistically significant
estimates. Panel B presents the effect of assignment to the Text & Black Image and Text & White
Image conditions as compared to the Text & Diverse Image condition only. As before, estimates
are mostly qualitatively small and statistically insignificant.

75

These regressions include controls for gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, age, household income,
region, political party affiliation, and whether participant passed the attention check question. Since survey
participants had to pass the attention check to be shown the questions inquiring about their socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics, only data provided by Lucid could be used in the analysis. As such, controls for
nativity, marital status, parental status, employment, and social assistance could not be included.
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Discussion
Welfare programs are often the subject of scrutiny among the public and targets for
reform among legislators. Motivating these attitudes and efforts are perceptions of beneficiaries
as undeserving of aid, disproportionately black, or both. Yet many of these beneficiaries are
children, who presumably cannot be undeserving. To the extent that views on welfare programs
are shaped by the groups perceived to be their beneficiaries, highlighting their more sympathetic
demographics may make them more appealing. This study presents the results from a large
survey experiment testing whether highlighting the child beneficiaries of SNAP—the largest
food assistance program in the country and one of the largest welfare programs—can boost
support for the program.
Overall, I find that accentuating the child beneficiaries of SNAP can boost support,
narrowly defined, for the program by nearly 19 percent. This is a meaningfully large effect. I
also find that this effect varies depending on how children are highlighted. Although the
estimates were not statistically different from one another, the effects of simply mentioning
children and mentioning children with an image of diverse children, black children, or white
children, increased support by roughly 18, 24, 14, and 18 percent, respectively. The same pattern
was observed when using a more expansive definition of support. In this context, the effect of
mentioning children together with an image of a diverse group of children was statistically
distinguishable from that of only mentioning children or doing so together with imagery of black
or white children.
These effects reveal a disturbing pattern, however. Although characterizing the children
benefitting from SNAP as black still leads to increases in support for the program, the effect is
less pronounced as compared to when children are characterized as diverse or white. This finding
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conforms with research revealing disparities across white and black children and youth in
criminal sentencing and school disciplinary sanctions, which may in part be due to negative
perceptions of blacks (Bridges & Steen, 1998; Monroe, 2005; Gregory, Skiba, & Noguera,
2010). To the extent that support for SNAP are driven by beliefs about the perceived
deservingness of children, this effect is somewhat counteracted by racial antipathies. Black
children do not elicit the same level of sympathy as their white counterparts.
I also find that highlighting children can boost support for SNAP among whites,
Republicans, and participants from high- and middle-income households, key political
constituencies that typically express lower support for welfare programs as compared to other
social and demographic groups. Given the association of more rigid and restrictive eligibility
criteria and program rules with political conservatism and racial attitudes, boosting support
among these groups may help to mitigate disparities in the implementation of SNAP across
jurisdictions, thereby helping to promote social equity and economic equality. Support is also
bolstered among Democrats and blacks, suggesting that that there is room for improvement on
this margin even among groups that typically favor welfare programs.
Qualitatively, the responsiveness of whites, Republicans, and those from middle-income
households reveals the same pattern as before. Among whites, these responses are statistically
distinguishable: estimated effects are smaller when children are characterized as black as
compared to white or diverse. Recalling that the image of diverse children includes a white child
and considering the latter two effects together suggests in-group bias—white adults are more
likely to favor white children. The disparity therefore suggests out-group aversion—white adults
are less likely to identify with black or minority children. Alternatively, however, depicting
children as diverse may also signal that SNAP is a universal program in that it serves people
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from all backgrounds rather than only minorities or a specific group (e.g., blacks), thereby
making it more appealing to whites.
In several extensions, I find that highlighting children also shifted underlying
motivations. Perceptions of beneficiaries as undeserving were softened when children were
mentioned among those that did not support the program, even when those children were black.
Characterizing children as white elicited more egalitarian sentiments among those who supported
the program. Finally, highlighting the children benefitting from TANF also bolsters support for
that program, though more so with regards to maintaining its current level of benefits than
increasing its expenditures—the exception being when children are characterized as white.
Whereas characterizing the children benefiting as black still raised support for SNAP overall, no
such effect was found in the context of TANF. In fact, disaggregating the results by key political
constituencies revealed that only when children were characterized as white or diverse, or not
racialized at all, was support for the program raised. In line with previous work suggesting that
public opinion on government programs is in part influenced by how those programs are
designed, participants may have made a distinction between SNAP, which offers vouchers that
can only be used for the purchase of food, and TANF, which offers assistance in the form of cash
In sum, highlighting the child beneficiaries of SNAP can boost public support for the
program and can be effective in the context of other welfare programs as well, though how the
child beneficiaries are characterized and in what way that information is conveyed matters. Of
concern is that black children do not elicit the same feelings of deservingness as white children.
Furthermore, considering that participants were told that SNAP expenditures on benefits
amounted to $66 billion in 2016—among the highest ever—shifts in support for the programs
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suggest that the public may be willing to spend far more than current levels on providing
households in need with assistance.
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Figure 10. Experimental Conditions
Panel A. SNAP Statements
The federal government provides food and nutrition assistance to
people living in the United States through the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (formerly the Food Stamp Program). In 2016, the
government provided $66 billion in food assistance to program
participants.
The federal government provides food and nutrition assistance to
people – including 20 million children – living in the United States
through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly the
Food Stamp Program). In 2016, the government provided $66 billion in
food assistance to program participants.
Panel B. TANF Statements
The federal and state governments provide cash assistance to families
living in the United States through the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families program. In 2016, state governments and the federal
government provided a combined $7 billion in cash assistance to
program participants.
The federal and state governments provide cash assistance to families
with children living in the United States through the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families program. In 2016, state governments and
the federal government provided a combined $7 billion in cash
assistance to program participants.

Note: The framing manipulations are bolded in the figure for clarity.
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Figure 11. Treatment Condition Images
Panel A. SNAP Images

Panel B. TANF Image

Note: From left to right in Panel A, image accompanying the SNAP statement in the Text & Image, Text
& Black Image, and Text & White Image conditions. Panel B shows image accompanying the TANF
statement in all treatment conditions involving images.
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Figure 12. Follow-up questions
Spending
preference
Increased

Remain
Unchanged

Decreased

I believe that…
…those who benefit from spending on [activity] could use more assistance.
…that the [entity] should be more involved in [activity].
…spending on [activity] is a good use of resources.
… spending on [activity] is a desirable thing to do.
…those who benefit from spending on [activity] are getting the assistance they need.
…the [entity] is as involved as it should be in [activity].
…spending on [activity] is neither a good nor bad use of resources.
…spending on [activity] is neither a desirable nor undesirable thing to do.
…those who benefit from spending on [activity] could be doing more to help themselves.
…the [entity] should not be involved in [activity].
…spending on [activity] is wasteful in how it spends on [activity].
…spending on [activity] is not a good use of resources.
…spending on [activity] is not a desirable thing to do.

Note: Figure displays the list of reasons participants are asked to choose from to indicate their underlying
motivation for their indicated spending preference.
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Figure 13. Percent Favoring Increased Spending across Control and Treatment Conditions

Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figures depict the percent
of participants in each treatment condition indicating a preference for increased spending, with the percent
indicating a preference for increased spending in the control condition represented by the dashed horizontal
line. The percent of participants favoring increased spending in each treatment condition was separately
compared to that for the control condition using t-tests. Robust standard errors with confidence intervals at
the 95% level.
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Figure 14. Treatment Effects on Spending Preferences, SNAP
Panel A. Any Treatment Condition

Panel B. By Type of Treatment

Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figures depict coefficient
estimates from three separate regressions with Increase SNAP or Increase or No Change SNAP as the
dependent variables. Panel A presents the effect of being assigned to any of the treatment conditions.
Panel B presents the effect of assignment to the Text Only condition or any of the image treatment
conditions (left) and assignment to the Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and
Text & White Image conditions (right), relative to the control. Each regression includes controls for age,
gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status,
parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors with
confidence intervals at 95% level.
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Figure 15. Distribution of Spending Preferences Across Conditions, SNAP
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Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figure shows the
distribution of spending preferences on SNAP across the control and treatment conditions.
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Percent

Figure 16. Spending Preferences in Control Condition by Race, Political Party, and Income
Panel A. Preferences for SNAP Spending
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Panel B. Preferences for TANF Spending
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Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figure shows preferences
for spending on SNAP and TANF among participants in the control group separately by race, political
party, and income.
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Figure 17. Distribution of Spending Preferences Across Conditions, TANF
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Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figure shows the
distribution of spending preferences on TANF across the control and treatment conditions.
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Table 13. Summary Statistics for Analytic Sample
Analytic Sample
2017 ACS 2018 GSS
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: Characteristics used by Lucid to match the US Census
Female
53
51
55
Hispanic
13
18
15
White
74
72
72
Black
12
13
16
Other
14
15
12
Bachelors or higher
34
32
33
Age
Young (18-34)
32
23
27
Middle (35-64)
52
39
59
Elderly (65+)
16
16
23
Household Income
Low ($0-24,999)
25
20.3
35
Middle ($25,000-74,999)
51
39.4
High ($75,000 or more)
24
40.3
Region
Northeast
20
17
15
Midwest
19
21
22
South
37
38
41
West
24
24
22
Panel B: Other characteristics
Born in USA
95
86
87
Married†
44
48
43
Parent
56
72
Employed††
55
60
59
Social assistance
26
‡
Democrat
38
32
Republican‡
31
23
Independent/other‡
32
46
Liberal‡‡
32
29
Conservative‡‡
34
33
Moderate‡‡
35
38
Minutes

2020 Gallup
(4)
29
30
39
26
35
35

14.02

Observations
3106
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. All figures for
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in percentages and rounded to the nearest integer. Columns
1 presents summary statistics for the analytic sample. Sample collected through an online survey experiment
conducted by Lucid between February 20, 2020 and March 7th, 2020. Columns 2, 3, and 4 present national
estimates for select variables for comparison. Column 2 presents data from the 2017 American Community
Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates. Column 3 presents data from the 2018 General Social Survey. Column 4
presents data from Gallup poll inquiring about political party affiliation and political ideology.
†
ACS Data for those 15 and older.
††
ACS Data for those 16 and older.
‡
Gallup data from February 2020 polling.
‡‡
Gallup data from 2018 Gallup polling.
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Table 14. Summary Statistics by Control and Treatment Conditions
Text &
Text &
Text &
Control Text Only
Image
Black Image White Image
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Female
51
53
51
54
54
Hispanic
13
11
12
15
13
White
75
71
73
75
74
Black
12
15
12
8
11
Other
13
14
14
16
14
Bachelors or higher
35
33
34
35
35
Age
Young (18-34)
32
34
33
29
33
Middle (35-64)
53
48
55
56
50
Elderly (65+)
15
18
12
15
17
Household Income
Low ($0-24,999)
27
25
24
23
25
Middle ($25,000-74,999)
50
53
51
52
49
High ($75,000 or more)
23
22
25
25
26
Born in USA
97
94
95
92
95
Married
41
44
44
46
44
Parent
54
56
53
59
58
Employed
52
54
56
56
56
Social assistance
28
27
25
25
25
Region
Northeast
20
20
17
22
23
Midwest
19
19
19
18
18
South
38
37
39
34
37
West
23
24
24
26
23
Democrat
38
40
38
36
36
Republican
29
28
30
33
33
Independent/other
33
32
32
31
31
Liberal
31
34
32
31
31
Conservative
34
32
33
35
36
Moderate
35
35
36
34
33
Minutes
Observations

19.19

12.43

11.94

14.36

12.19

615

643

603

637

608

Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. All figures for
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in percentages and rounded to the nearest integer.
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Table 15. Differential Responsiveness, SNAP, by Race, Political Party, and Income
Race
Political Party
Household Income
Whites
Blacks Republican Democrat High
Middle
Low
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Text Only

0.062**
(0.031)
Text & Diverse Image 0.137***
(0.031)
Text & Black Image
0.057*
(0.030)
Text & White Image
0.113***
(0.031)
Avg. in Control
Observations
R-squared

0.40
3,106
0.112

0.167**
(0.076)
-0.004
(0.081)
0.106
(0.088)
-0.039
(0.086)

0.102**
(0.047)
0.086*
(0.047)
0.033
(0.044)
0.073
(0.046)

0.083*
(0.044)
0.113**
(0.045)
0.102**
(0.045)
0.092**
(0.046)

.53
3,106
0.111

0.25
3,106
0.107

0.56
3,106
0.107

0.080 0.125*** -0.018
(0.055) (0.038) (0.053)
0.093* 0.134*** 0.049
(0.054) (0.038) (0.055)
0.066
0.062*
0.049
(0.052) (0.038) (0.053)
0.083 0.110*** 0.012
(0.054) (0.039) (0.054)
0.32
3,106
0.108

0.39
3,106
0.108

0.58
3,106
0.108

Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Each column represents a separate regression with the
characteristic corresponding to the column title interacted with Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image.
Across columns 1-8, the reference groups are whites, blacks, Republicans, and Democrats, and those from high-, middle-, and low-income
households, in the control condition, respectively. The dependent variable is Increase SNAP. Each regression includes controls for age, gender,
race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status, and receipt
of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 16. Strength of Spending Preference, SNAP
SNAP
Remain
Decreased
Increased
Unchanged
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
Text Only
Text & Diverse Image
Text & Black Image
Text & White Image

Avg. Control Score
Observations
R-squared

-0.164
(0.124)
0.079
(0.117)
-0.154
(0.120)
-0.048
(0.119)

0.090
(0.077)
-0.000
(0.080)
0.152**
(0.076)
0.127*
(0.077)

0.059
(0.052)
0.016
(0.055)
0.042
(0.053)
0.091*
(0.052)

2.21
456
0.062

1.70
1,115
0.042

2.46
1,480
0.066

Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Each column represents a
separate regression on a subsample stratified by participant’s spending preference corresponding to the
column title. The dependent variable in each is Strength SNAP. Each regression includes controls for age,
gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status,
parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 17. Motivation for Spending Preference, SNAP
Assistance Involvement Resources
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: Among Participants Preferring Decreased Spending
Text Only
-0.231*
-0.116
-0.228
(0.124)
(0.143)
(0.143)
Text & Diverse Image
-0.048
-0.001
-0.111
(0.117)
(0.144)
(0.147)
Text & Black Image
-0.195*
0.084
0.053
(0.107)
(0.132)
(0.132)
Text & White Image
-0.159
0.117
0.028
(0.106)
(0.131)
(0.137)

Desirability
(4)

Wastefulness
(5)

-0.092
(0.150)
0.135
(0.139)
0.032
(0.134)
0.075
(0.138)

-0.119
(0.125)
0.038
(0.116)
-0.025
(0.118)
0.023
(0.116)

1.55
443
0.043

2.34
459
0.112

Avg. Control Score
2.41
1.48
1.64
Observations
459
451
449
R-squared
0.090
0.053
0.041
Panel B: Among Participants Preferring No Change in Spending
Text Only
0.064
0.123
0.078
(0.071)
(0.077)
(0.080)
Text & Diverse Image
0.095
0.014
-0.039
(0.075)
(0.079)
(0.082)
Text & Black Image
0.185**
0.168**
0.028
(0.073)
(0.076)
(0.080)
Text & White Image
0.056
0.049
0.018
(0.073)
(0.078)
(0.079)
Avg. Control Score
1.79
1.73
1.51
Observations
1,125
1,117
1,102
R-squared
0.038
0.051
0.043
Panel C: Among Participants Preferring Increased Spending
Text Only
-0.029
0.021
0.001
(0.052)
(0.051)
(0.048)
Text & Diverse Image
-0.054
-0.039
-0.048
(0.055)
(0.054)
(0.051)
Text & Black Image
-0.022
-0.038
-0.024
(0.053)
(0.055)
(0.049)
Text & White Image
0.055
0.030
0.069
(0.050)
(0.051)
(0.046)

0.034
(0.078)
-0.087
(0.083)
-0.069
(0.080)
0.003
(0.078)
1.51
1,094
0.057
0.012
(0.049)
-0.025
(0.049)
0.022
(0.050)
0.085*
(0.046)

Avg. Control Score
2.53
2.55
2.61
2.59
Observations
1,491
1,485
1,485
1,485
R-squared
0.062
0.051
0.070
0.064
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Table presents the results
form separate regressions with the dependent variables corresponding to the column titles. Samples in
panels A, B and C include only observations indicating a preference for spending to be decreased, remain
unchanged, or increased, respectively. Each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and
ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status,
employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 18. Treatment Effects on Spending Preferences, TANF
Increase Increase or No Change
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Any Treatment
AnyTreat
0.041*
0.037**
(0.022)
(0.015)
R-squared

0.073

Panel B: By Type of Treatment
TO
0.033
(0.027)
AnyImageTreat
0.043*
(0.022)
R-squared

0.074

Panel C: By Type of Treatment
Text Only
0.033
(0.027)
Text & Diverse Image
0.031
(0.028)
Text & Black Image
0.010
(0.027)
Text & White Image 0.090***
(0.027)

0.048

0.041**
(0.019)
0.036**
(0.015)
0.048

0.041**
(0.019)
0.055***
(0.019)
0.018
(0.020)
0.035*
(0.020)

R-squared

0.076

0.049

Avg. in Control
Observations

.421
3,106

.842
3,106

Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Table depicts coefficient
estimates from six separate regressions with Increase TANF or Increase or No Change TANF as the
dependent variables. Panel A presents the effect of being assigned to any of the treatment conditions
(AnyTreat). Panel B presents the effect of assignment to the Text Only condition or any of the image
treatment conditions (AnyImageTreat). Panel C presents the effect of assignment to the Text Only, Text &
Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, or Text & White Image conditions. Each regression includes controls
for age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity,
marital status, parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 19. Differential Responsiveness, TANF, by Race, Political Party, and Income
Race
Political Party
Household Income
Whites Blacks
Republican Democrat
High
Middle
Low
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Text Only

0.032
(0.031)
Text & Diverse Image
0.038
(0.032)
Text & Black Image
0.005
(0.031)
Text & White Image
0.096***
(0.031)
Avg. in Control
R-squared
Observations

0.40
0.077
3,106

0.042
(0.078)
0.014
(0.083)
0.050
(0.089)
0.048
(0.084)

0.037
(0.046)
0.095**
(0.048)
0.028
(0.045)
0.084*
(0.047)

0.052
(0.044)
-0.064
(0.046)
-0.040
(0.046)
0.072
(0.046)

0.50
0.077
3,106

0.25
0.081
3,106

0.59
0.081
3,106

-0.051 0.077** 0.017
(0.054) (0.037) (0.053)
-0.001
0.055
0.012
(0.055) (0.039) (0.057)
-0.024
0.018
0.030
(0.054) (0.038) (0.055)
0.064 0.113*** 0.068
(0.054) (0.039) (0.055)
0.39
0.078
3,106

0.46
0.078
3,106

0.50
0.078
3,106

Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Each column represents a separate regression with the characteristic
corresponding to the column title interacted with Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image. Across columns
1-8, the reference groups are whites, blacks, Republicans, and Democrats, and those from high-, middle-, and low-income households, in the control
condition, respectively. The dependent variable is Increase TANF. Each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational
attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust
standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Appendix
Figure A3. Statement Images

Note: Images associated with the statements (excluding statements pertaining to SNAP and TANF). Images
in top row pertain to the state of California, Johnson & Johnson, Susan G. Komen, Amazon, New York
City, Walmart, and the NFL.
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Figure A4. Survey Statements
All Conditions:
1) The state government of California administers and finances numerous programs pertaining to the education of
its residents. In 2017, the state’s legislature approved a budget that allocated $75 billion toward spending on K-12
education and community colleges.
2) Johnson & Johnson is a for-profit medical device, pharmaceutical, and consumer packaged goods manufacturing
company based in the United States. In 2016, the company spent $9 billion on research and development, much of
it directed toward medications for rare conditions.

Control Condition:
3) The federal government provides food and nutrition assistance to people living in the United States through the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly the Food Stamp Program). In 2016, the government provided
$66 billion in food assistance to program participants.

Treatment Conditions:
3) The federal government provides food and nutrition assistance to people - including 20 million children - living
in the United States through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly the Food Stamp Program).
In 2016, the government provided $66 billion in food assistance to program participants.

All Conditions:
4) Susan G. Komen is a not-for-profit organization that promotes breast cancer awareness, research, health services,
and social support programs in the United States. In 2016, $21 million of the organization’s expenditures were
directed toward fundraising efforts.
5) Amazon is a for-profit online retailer and cloud-computing company based in the United States. In 2015, the
company donated $13 million to various charities via the AmazonSmiles foundation.
6) The New York City municipal government provides numerous services involving transportation, sewage, and
power for its residents. In 2015, the city approved a budget that allocated about $28 billion for infrastructure
spending.
7) Walmart is a for-profit retailer based in the United States. In 2016, the company donated $300 million to various
causes via the Walmart Foundation.
8) The National Football League (NFL) is a professional sports league representing 32 for-profit teams based in
the United States. In 2016, the league pledged to spend $100 million over five years on research and projects to
reduce the risk of head trauma among its athletes.

Control Condition:
9) The federal and state governments provide cash assistance to families living in the United States through the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. In 2016, state governments and the federal government
provided a combined $7 billion in cash assistance to program participants.

Treatment Conditions:
9) The federal and state governments provide cash assistance to families with children living in the
United States through the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. In 2016, state
governments and the federal government provided a combined $7 billion in cash assistance to program
participants.
Attention Check:
10) Tesla is a for-profit automotive and energy company based in the United States. In 2018, the
company increased its research and development budget by $90 million dollars.
Note: Figure presents the statements in the order they are presented to participants across all conditions.
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VARIABLES

Table A25. Treatment Effects on Spending Preferences, Alternative Models
Logit Models
Generalized Ordered Logit Models
SNAP
TANF
SNAP
TANF
Increase or
Increase or
Increase or
Increase or
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
No Change
No Change
No Change
No Change
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Text Only

0.351***
(0.121)
Text & Diverse Image 0.457***
(0.122)
Text & Black Image
0.264**
(0.120)
Text & White Image 0.355***
(0.122)
Observations

3,106

0.480***
(0.163)
0.775***
(0.176)
0.377**
(0.156)
0.446***
(0.163)

0.145
(0.117)
0.137
(0.121)
0.046
(0.119)
0.394***
(0.120)

0.358**
(0.172)
0.488***
(0.178)
0.144
(0.162)
0.292*
(0.168)

0.350***
(0.120)
0.453***
(0.122)
0.254**
(0.119)
0.352***
(0.121)

0.451***
(0.161)
0.739***
(0.176)
0.383**
(0.155)
0.407**
(0.161)

0.137
(0.116)
0.129
(0.121)
0.025
(0.119)
0.373***
(0.119)

0.383**
(0.172)
0.453**
(0.177)
0.128
(0.162)
0.271
(0.167)

3,106

3,106

3,106

3,106

3,106

3,106

3,106

Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Columns 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, present the results from separate
regressions where the dependent variables are Increase SNAP and Increase or No Change SNAP, and Increase TANF and Increase or No Change
TANF, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 present the output at the cutoffs from a single generalized ordered logit regression with Spending SNAP as
the dependent variable. Columns 7 and 8 present the same with Spending TANF as the dependent variable. Each regression includes controls for
age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status,
and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A26. Strength of Spending Preference, TANF
TANF
Remain
Decreased
Increased
Unchanged
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
Text Only
Text & Diverse Image
Text & Black Image
Text & White Image

Avg. Control Score
Observations
R-squared

-0.195*
(0.117)
-0.000
(0.132)
-0.096
(0.117)
0.003
(0.118)

0.097
(0.073)
0.000
(0.075)
0.091
(0.075)
0.012
(0.077)

-0.021
(0.055)
0.045
(0.054)
0.027
(0.054)
0.030
(0.052)

2.25
450
0.061

1.71
1,265
0.044

2.48
1,378
0.041

Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Each column represents a
separate regression on a subsample stratified by participant’s spending preference corresponding to the
column title. The dependent variable in each is Strength TANF. Each regression includes controls for age,
gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status,
parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A27. Motivation for Spending Preference, TANF
Assistance Involvement Resources Desirability Wastefulness
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Panel A: Among Participants Preferring Decreased Spending
Text Only
-0.029
-0.252*
-0.213
0.111
-0.155
(0.122)
(0.142)
(0.155)
(0.151)
(0.128)
Text & Diverse Image
-0.106
0.071
-0.036
0.132
-0.061
(0.136)
(0.150)
(0.145)
(0.156)
(0.141)
Text & Black Image
-0.171
-0.026
-0.234*
-0.028
-0.012
(0.123)
(0.141)
(0.134)
(0.141)
(0.119)
Text & White Image
0.048
-0.011
-0.097
-0.040
-0.016
(0.113)
(0.143)
(0.140)
(0.153)
(0.124)
Avg. Control Score
2.34
1.91
2.08
Observations
404
398
403
R-squared
0.136
0.072
0.126
Panel B: Among Participants Preferring No Change in Spending
Text Only
0.030
0.101
0.065
(0.067)
(0.069)
(0.073)
Text & Diverse Image
-0.028
0.052
-0.024
(0.069)
(0.073)
(0.076)
Text & Black Image
0.109
0.111
0.013
(0.068)
(0.072)
(0.076)
Text & White Image
-0.055
0.003
0.104
(0.073)
(0.075)
(0.078)
Avg. Control Score
1.77
1.76
1.55
Observations
1,277
1,276
1,263
R-squared
0.044
0.046
0.029
Panel C: Among Participants Preferring Increased Spending
Text Only
-0.049
-0.056
-0.017
(0.053)
(0.052)
(0.052)
Text & Diverse Image
-0.011
-0.011
0.018
(0.051)
(0.052)
(0.053)
Text & Black Image
-0.031
-0.032
-0.033
(0.051)
(0.053)
(0.053)
Text & White Image
-0.074
-0.048
-0.032
(0.052)
(0.050)
(0.053)

1.89
399
0.087

2.30
395
0.072

0.086
(0.071)
-0.033
(0.075)
-0.036
(0.074)
0.092
(0.076)
1.57
1,252
0.032
-0.045
(0.054)
-0.025
(0.056)
-0.043
(0.055)
-0.063
(0.054)

Avg. Control Condition
2.54
2.55
2.53
2.55
Observations
1,381
1,376
1,378
1,371
R-squared
0.053
0.045
0.047
0.045
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Table presents the results
form separate regressions with the dependent variables corresponding to the column titles. Samples in
panels A, B and C include only observations preferring for spending to be decreased, remain unchanged,
or increased, respectively. Each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and ethnicity,
educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status,
employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A28. Summary Statistics by Attention Check Response
Attention Check
Variable
Failed
Passed
Female
40
52
Hispanic
20
11
White
56
72
Black
21
12
Other
19
14
Bachelors or higher
32
34
Age
18-34
51
32
35-64
45
52
65+
4
16
Household Income
$0-24,999
43
33
$25,000-74,999
36
46
$75,000 or more
21
21
Region
Northeast
20
20
Midwest
17
19
South
38
37
West
25
24
Democrat
43
37
Republican
37
38
Independent/other
20
25
Minutes

12.48

14.10

812

3066

Observations

Note: All figures for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in percentages and rounded to the
nearest integer.
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Table A29. Preferences for Increased Spending, Alternative Samples
SNAP
TANF
Increase or
Increase or
Increase
Increase
No Change
No Change
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: All Observations
Text Only
0.073*** 0.048***
0.031
0.023
(0.025)
(0.018)
(0.024)
(0.017)
Text & Diverse Image 0.089*** 0.069***
0.023
0.037**
(0.025)
(0.017)
(0.025)
(0.017)
Text & Black Image
0.064***
0.030*
0.016
-0.001
(0.024)
(0.018)
(0.024)
(0.017)
Text & White Image
0.063**
0.041**
0.058**
0.024
(0.025)
(0.018)
(0.025)
(0.017)
Observations
R-squared

3,878
0.075

Panel B: 5 ≤ Minutes ≤ 25
Text Only
0.079***
(0.030)
Text & Diverse Image 0.067**
(0.030)
Text & Black Image
0.034
(0.030)
Text & White Image
0.065**
(0.030)
Observations
R-squared

3,878
0.072

3,878
0.080

3,878
0.040

0.067***
(0.024)
0.101***
(0.023)
0.059**
(0.024)
0.071***
(0.024)

0.033
(0.031)
0.010
(0.031)
-0.010
(0.030)
0.070**
(0.031)

0.041*
(0.022)
0.062***
(0.022)
0.025
(0.023)
0.036
(0.023)

2,460
0.109

2,460
0.077

2,460
0.057

2,460
0.125

Note: Table presents the results form separate regressions with the dependent variables corresponding to
the column titles. In Panel A, the sample includes all observations, regardless of whether the attention
check was passed, and each regression control for age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment,
and income. In Panel B, the sample includes only those that spent at least 5 minutes and no more than 25
minutes on the survey, and each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and ethnicity,
educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status,
employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A30. Manipulation Check
California
J&J
Komen Amazon NYC Walmart
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Panel A: Relative to Control condition
Text Only
0.028
-0.010
0.034
-0.002 0.004 -0.032
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Text & Diverse Image
0.017
0.017 0.057** 0.025 -0.006 -0.005
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Text & Black Image
0.024
0.011
0.031 0.067** 0.040
0.014
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Text & White Image
0.016
-0.036 0.052* 0.042
0.003
0.023
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Observations
R-squared

3,106
0.063

3,106
0.014

3,106
0.026

Panel B: Relative to Text & Image condition
Text & Black Image
0.006
-0.007 -0.025
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Text & White Image
-0.000
-0.054* -0.006
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028)

3,106
0.059

3,106
0.036

3,106
0.041

NFL
(7)
0.011
(0.028)
0.014
(0.028)
0.030
(0.028)
0.024
(0.028)
3,106
0.042

0.039
0.045
0.019
0.014
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
0.015
0.007
0.027
0.010
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)

Observations
1,848
1,848
1,848
1,848
1,848
1,848
1,848
R-squared
0.072
0.021
0.030
0.067
0.035
0.048
0.045
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Table presents the results
form separate regressions with the dependent variables corresponding to the column titles. In Panel B, the
analytic sample includes observations in either the Text & Image, Text & Black Image, or Text & White
Image conditions. Each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational
attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status, and
receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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